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Abstract
The problem of finding equilibria in non-cooperative games and understand-
ing their properties is a central problem in modern game theory. After John
Nash [45] proved that every finite game has at least one equilibrium (so-
called Nash equilibrium), the natural question arose whether we can com-
pute one efficiently. After several years of extensive research, we now know
that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete even for
two-player normal-form games [10] (see also [21]), making the task of find-
ing approximate Nash equilibria one of the central questions in the area
of equilibrium computation. In this thesis our main goal is a new study
of the complexity of various variants of the approximate Nash equilibrium.
Specifically, we study algorithms for additive approximate Nash equilibria
in bimatrix and multi-player games. Then, we study algorithms for rela-
tive approximate Nash equilibria in multi-player games. Furthermore, we
study algorithms for optimal approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games
and finally we study the communication complexity of additive approximate
Nash equilibria in bimatrix games.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
John Nash proved that every finite game (finite number of players and finite
number of strategies) has at least one Nash equilibrium [45]. This is a
guarantee that every finite game has at least one strategy profile that no
player has any incentive to deviate from. But, can we compute a Nash
equilibrium efficiently?
The problem of computing Nash equilibria is one of the most fundamen-
tal problems in algorithmic game theory. There were a lot of attempts to
find a polynomial-time algorithm for computing Nash equilibria, with the
most notable one the Lemke-Howson algorithm [41], a method to find a
Nash equilibrium for two-player games. Unfortunately, it was proved that
this algorithm has exponential worst-case performance [50]. Furthermore, it
is now known that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-
complete [21], even for two-player games [10]. Given this evidence of in-
tractability of the problem, further research has focused on the computa-
tion of approximate Nash equilibria. In this context—and assuming that all
payoffs are normalized to be in the [0, 1] interval1—the standard notions of
1It is easy to see that the set of the Nash equilibria of normal-form games is invariant
under additive and positive multiplicative transformations of the payoff matrices.
1
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approximation are the additive or relative approximation with a parameter
ε ∈ [0, 1]. There are two different variants of additive/relative approxima-
tion of Nash equilibria: the ε-Nash equilibrium and the ε-well-supported
Nash equilibrium.
An additive ε-Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile—one strategy for
each player—in which no player can improve her payoff by more than ε
through unilateral deviation from her strategy in the strategy profile. Sev-
eral polynomial-time algorithms have been proposed to find additive ε-Nash
equilibria in bimatrix games for ε = 3/4 by Kontogiannis et al. [37], for
ε = 1/2 and for ε = (3 − √5)/2 ≈ 0.382 by Daskalakis et al. [23, 22], for
ε = 1/2− 1/(3√6) ≈ 0.364 by Bosse et al. [7], and finally for ε ≈ 0.3393 by
Tsaknakis and Spirakis [51]. Also, a polynomial-time algorithm for additive
(1/3 + δ)-Nash equilibria, for any δ > 0, was given for symmetric bima-
trix games by Kontogiannis and Spirakis [39]. For more than two players,
there is a polynomial-time algorithm to give additive
(
m−1
m
)
-Nash equilib-
ria, where m is the number of players, and a recursive method to give an
additive
(
1
2−α
)
-Nash equilibrium for m players if we can find an additive α-
Nash equilibrium for m−1 players (see [7, 9, 35]). Furthermore, Deligkas et
al. gave a polynomial-time algorithm for computing additive (1/2+δ)-Nash
equilibria for polymatrix games [25], for any δ > 0. It is also known the exis-
tence of additive ε-Nash equilibria in normal-form games with support of size
O((logm+ log n− log ε)/ε2) for arbitrarily small ε > 0 [42, 35, 5], where
n is the number of pure strategies. This implies a quasi-polynomial-time
algorithm for games with constant number of players. For lower bounds, by
Feder et al. [28] it is known that, for any ε < 1/2, poly-logarithmic supports
of strategies are needed in order to find an additive ε-Nash equilibrium in
bimatrix games. In [48], Aviad Rubinstein proves that finding an additive
3ε-Nash equilibrium for some constant ε > 0 is PPAD-complete for the classes
of polymatrix and degree 3 graphical games, in which each player has only
two strategies. Recently, Rubinstein [49] has provided evidence that there is
a constant ε > 0, such that computing ε-Nash equilibria in bimatrix games
in time significantly better than the algorithm of [42] may not be possible.
An additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in
which the expected payoff of any pure strategy that is used in a mixed
strategy of a player is at most ε less than the expected payoff of the best-
response strategy (strategy that maximizes the expected payoff). It is a
notion stronger than that of an additive ε-Nash equilibrium: every additive
ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is also an additive ε-Nash equilibrium,
but not necessarily vice-versa. The smallest ε for which a polynomial-time
algorithm is currently known that computes an additive ε-well-supported
Nash equilibrium in an arbitrary bimatrix game is 0.6528 [38, 26, 27, 13]. By
Kontogiannis and Spirakis [38] we know that one can find additive 1/2-well-
supported Nash equilibria for the special class of win-lose bimatrix games in
polynomial-time. Also, by Czumaj et al. [16] we know how to find an addi-
tive (1/2+δ)-well-supported Nash equilibrium in symmetric bimatrix games,
for any δ > 0, in polynomial-time. Furthermore, the quasi-polynomial-time
algorithm for additive ε-Nash equilibria is also applied to additive ε-well-
supported Nash equilibria in bimatrix games, so it is known how to find ad-
ditive ε-well-supported Nash equilibria in quasi-polynomial time nO(logn/ε2)
for arbitrarily small ε > 0 [38]. On the negative side, poly-logarithmic sup-
ports of strategies are required for additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibria
[3, 2], for any ε < 1.
Our knowledge for relative approximations is limited. While the notion
of the additive approximate Nash equilibria has been studied extensively
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in the past, significantly less attention has been paid to the notion of the
relative approximate Nash equilibria: relative ε-Nash equilibria and relative
ε-well-supported Nash equilibria. Any relative approximate Nash equilibrium
is also an additive approximate Nash equilibrium, but not vice-versa. A
relative ε-Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in which the payoff of each
player is at least (1−ε) times the payoff of the best-response strategy. Most
of the relevant results we are aware of appeared in the paper of Feder et al.
[28] for bimatrix games. On the positive side, Feder et al. [28, Theorem 3]
give a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a relative ε-Nash equilibrium
for ε slightly smaller than 12 . (There exists a function f(n) = (2 + o(1))
n
such that for any α, 0 < α < 18nf(n) , one can find in polynomial-time a
relative (12 − α)-Nash equilibrium; the relative (12 − α)-Nash equilibrium
found is a pure row strategy and a mixed column strategy.) On the negative
side, Feder et al. [28, Theorem 1] show that for any α, 0 < α ≤ 12 , if
one limits the column player to strategies with support of size less than
log2 n
log2(1/α)
, then it is not possible to find a relative (12 − α)-Nash equilibrium,
even for constant-sum 0/1 games. Furthermore, Feder et al. [28, Theorem
2] show bimatrix constant-sum 0/1 games for which for any ε, 0 < ε < 12 ,
no pair of mixed strategies with supports of size smaller than O(ε−2 log n)
has a relative ε-Nash equilibrium. Further, in a related work, Daskalakis
[20] considers the notion of a relative ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium,
a strategy profile in which any pure strategy that is played by the players
has payoff at least (1− ε) times the best-response payoff. He shows that the
problem of finding a relative ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium in two-player
games, with payoff values in [−1, 1], is PPAD-complete, even for constant
values of approximation in some bimatrix games. Finally, in [48] Aviad
Rubinstein extends this result and he proves that finding a relative ε-well-
5supported Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game with positive payoffs is
PPAD-complete for constant values of approximation.
1.1 New contributions
In this thesis our main goal is a new study of the complexity of various
variants of the approximate Nash equilibrium. In Chapter 2, we study
polynomial-time algorithms for additive approximate Nash equilibria in bi-
matrix and multi-player games. Specifically, we present new techniques
based on zero-sum games and their applications to additive approximate
Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. Then, we present a polynomial-time al-
gorithm to compute additive 23 -well-supported Nash equilibria in bimatrix
games and a polynomial-time algorithm to compute additive (12 + δ)-well-
supported Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games, for any δ > 0. At
the end of this chapter, we study polynomial-time algorithms of additive
approximate Nash equilibria in multi-player games. Results presented in
this chapter are also presented in [13, 16, 14, 15].
In Chapter 3, we investigate algorithms for relative approximate Nash
equilibria. We first present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing rela-
tive 1/2-Nash equilibria in bimatrix games and then we generalize this result
to multi-player games. Results of Chapter 3 are also presented in [14].
In Chapter 4, we study polynomial-time algorithms for computing ad-
ditive ε-Nash equilibria in bimatrix games that are also close to the social
welfare of the game. Results of Chapter 4 are also presented in [17].
In Chapter 5, we study polynomial-time algorithms for computing ad-
ditive ε-Nash equilibria in bimatrix games that are also close to variants of
the social welfare of any Nash equilibrium of the game. Results of Chapter
5 are also presented in [18].
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Finally, in Chapter 6 we study the communication complexity of addi-
tive approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. We give an algorithm
to compute an additive (0.382 + δ)-Nash equilibrium and an algorithm to
compute an additive (2/3 + δ)-well-supported Nash equilibrium in bimatrix
games under the communication complexity constraint for any δ > 0. Some
parts of this chapter are also presented in [13].
1.2 Definitions — bimatrix games
We consider bimatrix games (R,C), where R,C ∈ [0, 1]n×n are the matrices
of payoffs for the two players: the row player and the column player, respec-
tively. If the row player uses a strategy i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and if the column one
uses a strategy j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then the row player receives payoff Rij and the
column player receives payoff Cij .
Let ∆ = {x ∈ [0, 1]n : ∑ni=1 x(i) = 1} be the set of mixed strategies:
a mixed strategy x is a probability distribution on the set of pure strategies
{1, 2, . . . , n}. If the row player uses a mixed strategy x and the column
player uses a mixed strategy y, then the row player receives payoff xTRy
and the column player receives payoff xTCy. A pair of strategies (x, y),
the former for the row player and the latter for the column player, is often
referred to as a strategy profile. We define the support supp(x) of a mixed
strategy x to be the set of pure strategies that have positive probability in x,
i.e., supp(x) = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n and x(i) > 0}. Let ei be the mixed strategy
such that a player plays the pure strategy i, in other words ei is the column
vector that has 1 in the coordinate i and 0 elsewhere. We define M(Ry)
the set of the pure best-response strategies (pure strategies that maximize
the expected payoff) of the row player against the strategy y of the column
player. Also, M(xTC) is the set of the pure best-response strategies of the
7column player against the strategy x of the row player.
For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Ri• be the row vector of the payoffs of the
payoff matrix R when the row player uses the strategy i, or in other words
eTi R. Note that if the row player uses a pure strategy i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
if the column player uses a mixed strategy y, then the row player receives
payoff Ri•y, or equivalently eTi Ry. Similarly, for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let
C•j be the column vector of the payoffs of the matrix C when the column
player uses the strategy j, or in other words Cej . Note that if the column
player uses a pure strategy j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and if the row player uses a mixed
strategy x, then the column player receives payoff xTC•j , or equivalently
xTCej .
We define fR(x, y)—the row regret of (x, y)—by fR(x, y) = max(Ry) −
xTRy, where max(Ry) = maxi(e
T
i Ry) and fC(x, y) —the column regret
of (x, y)—by fC(x, y) = max(x
TC)−xTCy, where max(xTC) = maxj(xTCej).
We define the maximum regret f(x, y) of a strategy profile (x, y) by f(x, y) =
max{fR(x, y), fC(x, y)}. We have the following definitions.
Definition 1.1 (Nash equilibrium (NE)) A Nash equilibrium is a strat-
egy profile (x∗, y∗) such that
• for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have Ri•y∗ ≤ (x∗)TRy∗, and
• for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have (x∗)TC•j ≤ (x∗)TCy∗,
or, in other words, if x∗ is a best-response strategy to y∗ and y∗ is a best-
response strategy to x∗.
Proposition 1.2 (Nash equilibrium) A strategy profile (x∗, y∗) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if f(x∗, y∗) = 0, or, in other words, the maximum
regret of the players is zero.
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Definition 1.3 (Additive ε-Nash equilibrium) For every ε > 0, an ad-
ditive ε-Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (x∗, y∗) such that
• for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have Ri•y∗ − (x∗)TRy∗ ≤ ε, and
• for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have (x∗)TC•j − (x∗)TCy∗ ≤ ε,
or, in other words, if x∗ is an ε-best-response strategy to y∗ and y∗ is an
ε-best-response strategy to x∗.
Proposition 1.4 (Additive ε-Nash equilibrium) A strategy profile (x∗,
y∗) is an additive ε-Nash equilibrium if and only if f(x∗, y∗) ≤ ε, or, in other
words, the maximum regret of the players is at most ε.
Note that an additive 0-Nash equilibrium is an exact Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1.5 (Additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium) For e-
very ε > 0, an additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strategy
profile (x∗, y∗) such that
• for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and i′ ∈ supp(x∗), we have Ri•y∗ −Ri′•y∗ ≤ ε,
and
• for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and j′ ∈ supp(y∗), we have (x∗)TC•j −
(x∗)TC•j′ ≤ ε,
or, in other words, if every i′ ∈ supp(x∗) is an ε-best-response strategy to y∗
and every j′ ∈ supp(y∗) is an ε-best response strategy to x∗.
Note that any additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is an additive ε-
Nash equilibrium and that an additive 0-well-supported Nash equilibrium is
an exact Nash equilibrium.
9Definition 1.6 (Relative ε-Nash equilibrium) For every ε > 0, a rel-
ative ε-Nash equilibrium2 is a strategy profile (x∗, y∗) such that
• for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have (x∗)TRy∗ ≥ (1− ε) ·Ri•y∗, and
• for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have (x∗)TCy∗ ≥ (1− ε) · (x∗)TC•j.
Note that a relative 0-Nash equilibrium is an exact Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1.7 (Relative ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium) For e-
very ε > 0, a relative ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile
(x∗, y∗) such that
• for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and i′ ∈ supp(x∗), we have (1 − ε) · Ri•y∗ ≤
Ri′•y∗, and
• for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and j′ ∈ supp(y∗), we have (1−ε) · (x∗)TC•j ≤
(x∗)TC•j′.
Note that any relative ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a relative ε-Nash
equilibrium and that a relative 0-well-supported Nash equilibrium is an exact
Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1.8 (Win-lose game) A game is win-lose if any payoff entry
belongs in {0, 1}.
Definition 1.9 (Symmetric game, symmetric Nash equilibrium) A
bimatrix game (R,C) is symmetric if C = RT .
2Let us note that we use the definition from Daskalakis in [20] that is consistent with
the notion of the additive ε-Nash equilibria, but it differs from the definition from Feder
et al. [28], where one replaced the (1 − ε) factor by ε. That is, the definition in Feder et
al. [28] for two players was that a strategy profile (x, y) is a “Feder-et-al.”-relative α-Nash
equilibrium if xTRy ≥ α · (x′)TRy and xTCy ≥ α · xTCy′ for all mixed strategies x′ and
y′.
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A symmetric Nash equilibrium in a symmetric bimatrix game (R,RT )
is a strategy profile (x∗, x∗) such that for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have
Ri•x∗ ≤ (x∗)TRx∗. Note that then it also follows that for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
we have:
(x∗)TRT•j = Rj•x
∗ ≤ (x∗)TRx∗ = (Rx∗)Tx∗ = (x∗)TRTx∗.
Let us recall a fundamental theorem of John Nash [45] about existence
of symmetric Nash equilibria in symmetric games.
Theorem 1.10 (John Nash [45]) Every finite symmetric game has a sym-
metric Nash equilibrium.
Now we will describe a general lemma for the additive ε-Nash equilibria
which has been used in all the previous algorithms that guarantee additive
ε-Nash equilibria (see [37, 7, 22, 23, 51]).
Lemma 1.11 Let (x1, y) and (x2, y) be two strategy profiles, with row re-
grets fR(x1, y), fR(x2, y) and column regrets fC(x1, y), fC(x2, y). Any con-
vex combination between these two strategy profiles has regrets no larger than
the convex combination of the regrets.
Proof. Consider a convex combination (px1 + (1 − p)x2, y), for some p ∈
[0, 1]. Then, the regret of the row player is:
fR(px1 + (1− p)x2, y) = max(Ry)− (px1 + (1− p)x2)TRy
= max(Ry)− p(x1)TRy − (1− p)(x2)TRy
= pmax(Ry) + (1− p) max(Ry)− p(x1)TRy − (1− p)(x2)TRy
= pfR(x1, y) + (1− p)fR(x2, y),
since fR(x1, y) = max(Ry)− (x1)TRy, and fR(x2, y) = max(Ry)− (x2)TRy.
11
The regret of the column player is:
fC(px1 +(1−p)x2, y) = max((px1 +(1−p)x2)TC)− (px1 +(1−p)x2)TCy
≤ pmax((x1)TC) + (1− p) max((x2)TC)− p(x1)TCy − (1− p)(x2)TCy
= pfC(x1, y) + (1− p)fC(x2, y),
since fC(x1, y) = max((x1)
TC)− (x1)TCy, and fC(x2, y) = max((x2)TC)−
(x2)
TCy. uunionsq
We now give a definition that we use it to prove additive ε-well-supported
Nash equilibria.
Definition 1.12 (Preventing exceeding payoffs) We say that a strat-
egy x ∈ [0, 1]n for the row player prevents exceeding u ∈ [0, 1] if for every
j = 1, 2, . . . , n, we have xTC•j ≤ u or, in other words, if the column player
payoff of the best-response strategy to x does not exceed u. Similarly, we say
that a strategy y ∈ [0, 1]n for the column player prevents exceeding v ∈ [0, 1]
if for every i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we have Ri•y ≤ v or, in other words, if the row
player payoff of the best-response strategy to y does not exceed v.
For brevity, we say that a strategy profile (x, y) prevents exceeding (v, u)
if x prevents exceeding u and y prevents exceeding v.
Observe that the following system of linear constraints PE(v, u) charac-
terizes strategy profiles (x, y) that prevent exceeding (v, u) ∈ [0, 1]2:
n∑
i=1
x(i) = 1; x(i) ≥ 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n;
n∑
j=1
y(j) = 1; y(j) ≥ 0 for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n;
Ri•y ≤ v for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n;
xTC•j ≤ u for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
12 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Note that if (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium then, by definition, it prevents
exceeding (xTRy, xTCy), which implies the following Proposition.
Proposition 1.13 If (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium, v ≥ xTRy, and u ≥
xTCy, then PE(v, u) has a solution and it prevents exceeding (v, u).
By the following proposition, in order to find an additive ε-well-supported
Nash equilibrium it suffices to find a strategy profile that prevents exceeding
(ε, ε).
Proposition 1.14 If a strategy profile (x, y) prevents exceeding (v, u) then
it is an additive max(v, u)-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let i′ ∈ supp(x) and let i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n }. Then we have:
Ri•y −Ri′•y ≤ Ri•y ≤ v,
where the first inequality follows from Ri′•y ≥ 0, and the other one holds
because y prevents exceeding v. Similarly, and using the assumption that
x prevents exceeding u, we can argue that for all j′ ∈ supp(y) and j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}, we have xTC•j − xTC•j′ ≤ u. It follows that (x, y) is a
max(v, u)-well-supported Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
We now introduce another definition which we also use to prove additive
ε-well-supported Nash equilibria.
Definition 1.15 (Well supporting payoffs) We say that a strategy x ∈
[0, 1]n for the row player well supports v ∈ [0, 1] against a strategy y ∈ [0, 1]n
for the column player if for every i ∈ supp(x), we have Ri•y ≥ v. Similarly,
we say that a strategy y ∈ [0, 1]n for the column player well supports u ∈
[0, 1] against a strategy x ∈ [0, 1]n for the row player if for every j ∈ supp(y),
we have xTC•j ≥ u.
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For brevity, we say that a strategy profile (x, y) well supports (v, u) if x
well supports v against y and y well supports u against x.
By the following proposition, in order to find an additive ε-well-supported
Nash equilibrium it suffices to find a strategy profile that well supports
(1− ε, 1− ε).
Proposition 1.16 If a strategy profile (x, y) well supports (v, u) then it is
an additive max(1− v, 1− u)-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let i′ ∈ supp(x) and let i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n }. Then we have:
Ri•y −Ri′•y ≤ Ri•y − v ≤ 1− v,
where the first inequality follows from Ri′•y ≥ v, and the other one holds
because Ri•y ≤ 1. Similarly, for the column player. It follows that (x, y) is
a max(1− v, 1− u)-well-supported Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
We now define zero-sum bimatrix games and we present some properties
of them that we use to find additive approximate Nash equilibria.
Definition 1.17 (Zero-sum game) A bimatrix game (R,C) ∈ Rn×n is
zero-sum if and only if C = −R.
Note that we can compute exact Nash equilibria in polynomial-time in
zero-sum games using linear programming.
Let (A,−A) be a zero-sum game with Nash equilibrium (x, y) and value
v = xTAy. Then, by the definition of the Nash equilibrium we know that
• for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have Ai•y ≤ v, and
• for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have (x)TA•j ≥ v,
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we can see that y prevents exceeding v. Let (−A,A) be a zero-sum game
with Nash equilibrium (x, y) and value u = xTAy. Then, by the definition
of the Nash equilibrium we know that
• for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have Ai•y ≥ u, and
• for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have (x)TA•j ≤ u,
we can see that x prevents exceeding u.
1.3 Definitions — multiplayer games
Consider a normal-form game with m players. Each player has n strategies
at the disposal and the entries of the payoff matrices are in [0, 1]. A mixed
strategy x ∈ [0, 1]n is a column vector that describes a probability distribu-
tion on the n pure strategies of a player; a support of a mixed strategy x is
the set of the pure strategies k such that x(k) > 0. We write x−i for the
strategy profile of all players except for the player i. If the player i plays a
mixed strategy xi, then the expected payoff of the player i is ui(xi, x−i).
A Nash equilibrium is any strategy profile x = (xi, x−i) such that if
every player randomizes according to x, then no player has an incentive to
change her mixed strategy. More formally, a strategy profile x = (xi, x−i)
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for every i ui(xi, x−i) ≥ ui(x′i, x−i), for
every mixed strategy x′i. Equivalently, a strategy profile x = (xi, x−i) is a
Nash equilibrium if and only if for all players i
ui(xi, x−i) ≥ ui(ek, x−i) for every k = 1, . . . , n,
where ek represents the unit vector along dimension k of Rn, that is, ek ∈
[0, 1]n is the column vector with 1 in its coordinate k and 0 elsewhere.
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As in bimatrix games, there are two main models of approximate Nash
equilibria studied in the literature, one focusing on the additive quality in-
centive and another concerned with the relative quality incentive. We will
describe the additive/relative ε-Nash equilibrium, assuming that the payoff
matrices of the players have all entries in [0, 1].
For any ε ≥ 0, an additive ε-Nash equilibrium is any strategy profile
x = (xi, x−i) such that for every player i ui(xi, x−i) ≥ ui(x′i, x−i) − ε, for
every strategy x′i. Equivalently, a strategy profile x = (xi, x−i) is an additive
ε-Nash equilibrium if for every player i
ui(xi, x−i) ≥ ui(ek, x−i)− ε for every k = 1, . . . , n.
Note that an additive 0-Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
For any ε ≥ 0, a relative ε-Nash equilibrium is any strategy profile x =
(xi, x−i) such that for every player i ui(xi, x−i) ≥ ui(x′i, x−i)−ε·ui(x′i, x−i) =
(1− ε) ·ui(x′i, x−i), for every mixed strategy x′i. Equivalently, for any ε ≥ 0,
a strategy profile x = (xi, x−i) is a relative ε-Nash equilibrium if and only
if for every player i
ui(xi, x−i) ≥ (1− ε) · ui(ek, x−i) for every k = 1, . . . , n.
Similarly, a relative 0-Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
Part I
Algorithms for approximate
Nash equilibria
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Chapter 2
Additive approximate Nash
equilibria
In this chapter, we study algorithms for additive approximate Nash equi-
libria. We first describe the state-of-art for additive ε-Nash equilibria in
bimatrix games, the Tsaknakis-Spirakis algorithm [51]. Then, we present
new techniques that are based on zero-sum games and their applications
to additive approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. After this we
present methods to compute additive 23 -well-supported Nash equilibria in
arbitrary bimatrix games and additive (12 + δ)-well-supported Nash equilib-
ria in symmetric bimatrix games, for any δ > 0. Finally, we study issues of
additive approximate Nash equilibria in multi-player games.
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2.1 Tsaknakis-Spirakis algorithm
In this section we will describe the Tsaknakis-Spirakis algorithm [51] for
computing additive 0.3393-Nash equilibria, the state-of-art for computing
additive ε-Nash equilibria in bimatrix games.
2.1.1 Directional Derivative of Regret
Our main interest in this section is to identify and study the properties
of stationary points of the regret function on the set of strategy profiles,
because—as observed by Tsaknakis and Spirakis [51], and as we elaborate
later—they are crucial to obtain additive ε-Nash equilibria with low regret.
Let (x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ ∆2 be strategy profiles, and let f be the regret func-
tion as it was defined in the Chapter 1. We define the directional derivative
of f at (x, y) towards (x′, y′) by:
∇(x′,y′)f(x, y) = lim
ε↘0
f
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y)
ε
,
if the limit exists.
Lemma 2.1 [51] For all strategy profiles (x, y) and (x′, y′), the directional
derivative ∇(x′,y′)f(x, y) is well defined. More specifically, we have: If
fR(x, y) > fC(x, y) then
∇(x′,y′)f(x, y) = ∇(x′,y′)fR(x, y) =
max
M(Ry)
(Ry′)− xTRy′ − (x′)TRy + xTRy − fR(x, y),
and if fR(x, y) < fC(x, y) then
∇(x′,y′)f(x, y) = ∇(x′,y′)fC(x, y) =
max
M(xTC)
(
(x′)TC
)− (x′)TCy − xTCy′ + xTCy − fC(x, y).
20 CHAPTER 2. ADDITIVE APPROXIMATE NASH EQUILIBRIA
If fR(x, y) = fC(x, y) then
∇(x′,y′)f(x, y) = max
{
∇(x′,y′)fR(x, y),∇(x′,y′)fC(x, y)
}
.
Proof. Recall that M(Ry) (as defined in Chapter 1) is the set of the pure
best-response strategies of the row player to the mixed strategy y of the
column player, and the complement of M(Ry) is M(Ry) = {1, . . . , n} \
M(Ry). Also,M(xTC) is the set of the pure best-response strategies of the
column player to strategy x of the row player. The complement ofM(xTC)
is M(xTC) = {1, . . . , n} \M(xTC). The difference of the regrets between
the points (1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′) and (x, y) is equal to
f
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y) =
= max
{
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
, fC
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)}
− f(x, y) = max
{
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y),
fC
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y)
}
.
With this at hand and by the definition of the directional derivative of the
regret function we have that the directional derivative of the regret function
is equal to
∇(x′,y′)f(x, y) = max
{
lim
ε↘0
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y)
ε
,
lim
ε↘0
fC
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y)
ε
}
We analyse the part
lim
ε↘0
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y)
ε
,
since the other part is analogous. First we will analyse the part fR
(
(1 −
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ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
, so this part is equal to
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
=
= max
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
−
(
(1− ε)x+ εx′
)T
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
)
= max
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
− (1− ε)2xTRy − ε(1− ε)xTRy′
− ε(1− ε)(x′)TRy − ε2(x′)TRy′ = max
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
− xTRy − ε2xTRy + 2εxTRy − εxTRy′ + ε2xTRy′
− ε(x′)TRy + ε2(x′)TRy − ε2(x′)TRy′.
However, we can write up the max
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
as
max
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
=
= max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
+ max
{
0, max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
− max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))}
.
So, we have that
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
=
= max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
+ max
{
0, max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
− max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))}
− xTRy − ε2xTRy + 2εxTRy
− εxTRy′ + ε2xTRy′ − ε(x′)TRy + ε2(x′)TRy − ε2(x′)TRy′. (2.1)
We can see that lim
ε↘0
max
{
0,maxM(Ry)
(
R
(
(1−ε)y+εy′
))
−maxM(Ry)
(
R(
(1−ε)y+εy′
))}
= 0, since lim
ε↘0
maxM(Ry)
(
R
(
(1−ε)y+εy′
))
−maxM(Ry)(
R
(
(1 − ε)y + εy′
))
< 0 because M(Ry) is the set of the pure strategies
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that they are not best-responses to y. Thus, we summarize that
lim
ε↘0
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y)
ε
=
= lim
ε↘0
maxM(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
− xTRy − ε2xTRy + 2εxTRy
ε
−εxTRy′ + ε2xTRy′ − ε(x′)TRy + ε2(x′)TRy − ε2(x′)TRy′ − f(x, y)
ε
= lim
ε↘0
maxM(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
− xTRy + 2εxTRy − εxTRy′
ε
−ε(x′)TRy − f(x, y)
ε
= lim
ε↘0
(1− ε) maxM(Ry)(Ry) + εmaxM(Ry)(Ry′)
ε
−xTRy + 2εxTRy − εxTRy′ − ε(x′)TRy − f(x, y)
ε
,
the second equality holds since lim
ε↘0
−ε2xTRy+ε2xTRy′+ε2(x′)TRy−ε2(x′)TRy′
ε = 0.
The third equality holds by the property of maxM(Ry)
(
R
(
(1−ε)y+εy′
))
=
(1− ε) maxM(Ry)(Ry) + εmaxM(Ry)(Ry′), in which the equality holds since
every strategy in M(Ry) is a pure best-response strategy to y, so has the
same expected payoff against y. We have three cases: fR(x, y) > fC(x, y),
fR(x, y) = fC(x, y), and fR(x, y) < fC(x, y).
• If fR(x, y) > fC(x, y),
lim
ε↘0
fC
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y)
ε
=
= lim
ε↘0
fC
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− fR(x, y)
ε
= −∞,
since f(x, y) = fR(x, y) > fC(x, y), and
lim
ε↘0
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y)
ε
=
= max
M(Ry)
(Ry′)− (x′)TRy − xTRy′ + xTRy − fR(x, y)
= max
M(Ry)
(Ry′)− (x′)TRy − xTRy′ + xTRy − f(x, y).
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The first equality holds since maxM(Ry)(Ry) = max(Ry) and the sec-
ond equality holds since f(x, y) = fR(x, y).
• If fR(x, y) < fC(x, y),
lim
ε↘0
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y)
ε
=
= lim
ε↘0
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− fC(x, y)
ε
= −∞,
since f(x, y) = fC(x, y) > fR(x, y), and
lim
ε↘0
fC
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y)
ε
=
= max
M(xTC)
((x′)TC)− (x′)TCy − xTCy′ + xTCy − fC(x, y)
= max
M(xTC)
((x′)TC)− (x′)TCy − xTCy′ + xTCy − f(x, y).
The first equality holds since maxM(xTC)(xTC) = max(xTC) and the
second equality holds since f(x, y) = fC(x, y).
• If fR(x, y) = fC(x, y),
lim
ε↘0
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y)
ε
=
= max
M(Ry)
(Ry′)− (x′)TRy − xTRy′ + xTRy − fR(x, y)
= max
M(Ry)
(Ry′)− (x′)TRy − xTRy′ + xTRy − f(x, y).
The first equality holds since maxM(Ry)(Ry) = max(Ry) and the sec-
ond equality holds since f(x, y) = fR(x, y).
lim
ε↘0
fC
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y)
ε
=
= max
M(xTC)
((x′)TC)− (x′)TCy − xTCy′ + xTCy − fC(x, y)
= max
M(xTC)
((x′)TC)− (x′)TCy − xTCy′ + xTCy − f(x, y).
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The first equality holds since maxM(xTC)(xTC) = max(xTC) and the
second equality holds since f(x, y) = fC(x, y).
We summarize, so in total we have that
• If fR(x, y) > fC(x, y),
∇(x′,y′)f(x, y) =
= max
{
max
M(Ry)
(Ry′)− (x′)TRy − xTRy′ + xTRy − f(x, y),−∞
}
= max
M(Ry)
(Ry′)− (x′)TRy − xTRy′ + xTRy − f(x, y).
• If fR(x, y) < fC(x, y),
∇(x′,y′)f(x, y) =
= max
{
−∞, max
M(xTC)
(
(x′)TC
)
− (x′)TCy−xTCy′+xTCy−f(x, y)
}
= max
M(xTC)
(
(x′)TC
)
− (x′)TCy − xTCy′ + xTCy − f(x, y).
• If fR(x, y) = fC(x, y),
∇(x′,y′)f(x, y) =
= max
{
max
M(Ry)
(Ry′)− (x′)TRy − xTRy′ + xTRy − f(x, y),
max
M(xTC)
(
(x′)TC
)
− (x′)TCy − xTCy′ + xTCy − f(x, y)
}
= max
{
max
M(Ry)
(Ry′)− (x′)TRy − xTRy′ + xTRy,
max
M(xTC)
(
(x′)TC
)
− (x′)TCy − xTCy′ + xTCy
}
− f(x, y).
uunionsq
We now give a definition of the stationary and δ-stationary points of the
regret function f for any δ ≥ 0.
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Definition 2.2 A strategy profile (x, y) is a stationary point of the re-
gret function f if and only if for every strategy profile (x′, y′) we have
∇(x′,y′)f(x, y) ≥ 0.
Definition 2.3 A strategy profile (x, y) is a δ-stationary point of the regret
function f if and only if for any δ ∈ [0, 1] and for every strategy profile
(x′, y′) we have ∇(x′,y′)f(x, y) ≥ −δ.
Note that any 0-stationary point is a stationary point of the function.
Lemma 2.4 If (x, y) is a stationary point of the regret function f , then the
regrets of the players at the point (x, y) are equal.
Proof. Let (x, y) be a stationary point with not equal regrets, we assume
without loss of generality that fR(x, y) > fC(x, y). We consider a direction
of (x′, y), where x′ is a best-response strategy to y. Since, we are in a
stationary point the directional derivative in this point for this direction is
non-negative, ∇(x′,y)f(x, y) ≥ 0, so we have that
max
M(Ry)
(Ry)− (x′)TRy − xTRy + xTRy − fR(x, y) ≥ 0,
this implies that fR(x, y) ≤ maxM(Ry)(Ry)− (x′)TRy = 0, since (x′)TRy =
max(Ry) = maxM(Ry)(Ry), since x′ is a best-response to y. But, by defini-
tion fC(x, y) ≥ 0, so we have that 0 > fC(x, y) ≥ 0, this is a contradiction.
uunionsq
2.1.2 An LP for Minimizing Directional Derivative
We present a linear program that—for a given strategy profile (x, y)—yields
another strategy profile (x′, y′) for which the directional derivative of the
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regret function ∇(x′,y′)f(x, y) is minimized.
minimize γ (2.2)
s.t. x′(i) ≥ 0, y′(j) ≥ 0 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n (2.3)
n∑
i=1
x′(i) = 1,
n∑
j=1
y′(j) = 1 (2.4)
γ ≥ Ri•y′ − (xTR)y′ − (Ry)Tx′ + xTRy i ∈M(Ry) (2.5)
γ ≥ CT•jx′ − (xTC)y′ − (Cy)Tx′ + xTCy j ∈M(xTC) (2.6)
Henceforth we refer to this linear program as the primal.
Consider the dual linear program, with dual variables a and b, respec-
tively, corresponding to primal constraints (2.4); dual variables pi, for all
i ∈ M(Ry), corresponding to primal constraints (2.5); and dual variables
qj , for all j ∈M(xTC), corresponding to primal constraints (2.6).
maximize P · xTRy +Q · xTCy + a+ b (2.7)
s.t. pi ≥ 0 i ∈M(Ry)
(2.8)
qj ≥ 0 j ∈M(xTC)
(2.9)
P =
∑
i∈M(Ry)
pi, Q =
∑
j∈M(xTC)
qj (2.10)
P +Q = 1 (2.11)
a ≤
∑
i∈M(Ry)
−(Ry)kpi +
∑
j∈M(xTC)
[−(Cy)k + Ckj ]qj 1 ≤ k ≤ n
(2.12)
b ≤
∑
j∈M(xTC)
−(xTC)lqj +
∑
i∈M(Ry)
[−(xTR)l +Ril]pi 1 ≤ l ≤ n
(2.13)
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Henceforth, we refer to this linear program as the dual. Note that pri-
mal variables x′(k), for all k rows, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, correspond to dual con-
straints (2.12); primal variables y′(l), for all l columns, 1 ≤ l ≤ n, corre-
spond to dual constraints (2.13); and the primal variable γ corresponds to
the dual constraint (2.11). Note that the dual variables P and Q are merely
auxiliary variables (defined by the auxiliary dual constraints (2.10)) that
help unclutter the description of the objective function of the dual linear
program, and its analysis that is to follow.
2.1.3 Intuition behind the dual
We can see that for every k the constraint
a ≤
∑
i∈M(Ry)
−(Ry)kpi +
∑
j∈M(xTC)
[−(Cy)k + Ckj ]qj ,
can be written as
a ≤ −P · (Ry)k −Q · (Cy)k + Ck•q,
if we divide and multiply with
∑
j∈M(xTC) qj then we get:
a ≤ −P · (Ry)k −Q · (Cy)k +Q · Ck•z,
where z = q/
∑
j∈M(xTC) qj is a best-response strategy to x, since j ∈
M(xTC) and qj = 0 for j /∈M(xTC). It is easy to see that if
∑
j∈M(xTC) qj =
0, we just omit the last two terms of the inequality.
Similarly, for the other constraints for every l
b ≤
∑
j∈M(xTC)
−(xTC)lqj +
∑
i∈M(Ry)
[−(xTR)l +Ril]pi,
this implies that
b ≤ −Q · (xTC)l − P · (xTR)l + pR•l,
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we divide and multiply with
∑
i∈M(Ry) pi then we get
b ≤ −Q · (xTC)l − P · (xTR)l + P · wTR•l,
where w = p/
∑
i∈M(Ry) pi is a best-response strategy to y, since i ∈M(Ry)
and pi = 0 for i /∈M(Ry). It is easy to see that if
∑
i∈M(Ry) pi = 0, we just
omit the last two terms of the inequality.
So, the dual maximizes the minimum over all rows k and all columns l.
For any k, l we have
P · wTR•l − P · (Ry)k − P · (xTR)l + P · xTRy
+Q · Ck•z −Q · (Cy)k −Q · (xTC)l +Q · xTCy
≥ a+ b+ P · xTRy +Q · xTCy = γ.
The inequality holds since
−P · (Ry)k +−Q · (Cy)k +Q · Ck•z ≥ a,
and
−Q · (xTC)l − P · (xTR)l + P · wTR•l ≥ b.
The equality holds since the value of the primal is equal with the value of
the dual. But we can easily see that for any strategies x′ and y′ it holds that
P · wTRy′ − P · (x′)TRy − P · xTRy′ + P · xTRy
+Q · (x′)TCz −Q · (x′)TCy −Q · xTCy′ +Q · xTCy ≥ γ,
this implies that
P · (wTRy′ − (x′)TRy − xTRy′ + xTRy)
+Q · ((x′)TCz − (x′)TCy − xTCy′ + xTCy) ≥ γ.
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However, from the primal we know that if (x, y) is δ-stationary point then
∇(x′,y′)f(x, y) = γ − f(x, y) ≥ −δ,
or, in other words, f(x, y) ≤ γ + δ. Thus, we conclude that
f(x, y) ≤ γ + δ ≤ P · (wTRy′ − (x′)TRy − xTRy′ + xTRy)
+Q · ((x′)TCz − (x′)TCy − xTCy′ + xTCy) + δ, (2.14)
for any direction (x′, y′).
Theorem 2.5 If P or Q is equal to zero, the 0-stationary point is an exact
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that P = 0. Then, by (2.14)
we have that
f(x, y) ≤ Q · ((x′)TCz − (x′)TCy − xTCy′ + xTCy). (2.15)
Then, for the direction (x, y′), where y′ is a best-response strategy to x,
(2.15) becomes
f(x, y) ≤ Q · (xTCz − xTCy − xTCy′ + xTCy) = Q · (xTCz − xTCy′) = 0,
since z is also a best-response strategy to x. uunionsq
2.1.4 Tsaknakis-Spirakis analysis of stationary points
In this subsection we will describe the analysis of Tsaknakis-Spirakis of
taking approximation bound 0.3393 as it was given in [51]. Let (x, y) be a
0-stationary point. We define
λ = min
y′:supp(y′)⊆M(xTC)
(wTRy′ − xTRy′) (2.16)
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and
µ = min
x′:supp(x′)⊆M(Ry)
((x′)TCz − (x′)TCy). (2.17)
From the support of x′, y′ we can see that y′ is a best-response strategy to
x and x′ is a best-response strategy to y. For the direction (x, y′) by (2.14)
we get:
f(x, y) ≤ P · (wTRy′ − xTRy′) = P · λ.
For the direction (x′, y) by (2.14) we get:
f(x, y) ≤ Q · ((x′)TCz − (x′)TCy) = Q · µ.
Since z is a best-response strategy to x and (2.16) we get:
wTRz − xTRz ≥ λ, (2.18)
and since w is a best-response strategy to y and (2.17) we get:
wTCz − wTCy ≥ µ. (2.19)
Without loss of generality we assume that λ ≥ µ, the analysis in the
case µ ≥ λ is analogous. Firstly, we analyse the regrets of the two players in
the points (x, z) and (w, z). The regret of the row player in the point (x, z)
is fR(x, z) ≤ 1, which follows by the fact that max(Rz) ≤ 1. The regret of
the column player is fC(x, z) = 0, since z is a best-response strategy to x.
Now, we analyse the regrets of the players in the point (w, z). The regret of
the row player is fR(w, z) = max(Rz)−wTRz ≤ 1− λ− xTRz ≤ 1− λ, the
first inequality holds since max(Rz) ≤ 1 and (2.18). The second inequality
holds since xTRz ≥ 0. The regret of the column player is fC(w, z) =
max(wTC)−wTCz ≤ 1−µ−wTCy ≤ 1−µ, the first inequality holds since
max(wTC) ≤ 1 and (2.19). The second inequality holds since wTCy ≥ 0.
Theorem 2.6 The strategy profile
(
1
1+λ−µw +
λ−µ
1+λ−µx, z
)
is an additive(
1−µ
1+λ−µ
)
-Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. The regret of the row player, by Lemma 1.11, is:
fR
(
1
1 + λ− µw +
λ− µ
1 + λ− µx, z
)
=
=
1
1 + λ− µfR(w, z) +
λ− µ
1 + λ− µfR(x, z)
≤ 1− λ
1 + λ− µ +
λ− µ
1 + λ− µ =
1− µ
1 + λ− µ.
The inequality holds since fR(w, z) ≤ 1−λ and fR(x, z) ≤ 1. The regret
of the column player, by Lemma 1.11, is:
fC
(
1
1 + λ− µw +
λ− µ
1 + λ− µx, z
)
≤
≤ 1
1 + λ− µfC(w, z) +
λ− µ
1 + λ− µfC(x, z) ≤
1− µ
1 + λ− µ.
The second inequality holds since fC(w, z) ≤ 1− µ and fC(x, z) = 0. uunionsq
So, depending on the values of µ, λ we pick either the stationary point (x, y),
or the strategy profile
(
1
1+λ−µw +
λ−µ
1+λ−µx, z
)
. As it was proved in [51] it
gives a guaranteed bound of
max
P,Q,λ,µ
min
{
P · λ,Q · µ, 1− µ
1 + λ− µ
}
≤ 0.3393.
2.1.5 The algorithm
Now, we will describe the steepest descent algorithm for finding additive
(0.3393 + δ)-Nash equilibria, for any δ > 0. The steps of the algorithm are:
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1. Pick an arbitrary point.
2. Find a point (x, y), using the LP as it is described in 2.1.6, where the regrets
are equal, fR(x, y) = fC(x, y).
3. If f(x, y) ≤ 0.3393 + δ, stop and return (x, y).
4. Check if (x, y) is a δ-stationary point.
• If (x, y) is a δ-stationary point, stop and if λ ≥ µ return ( 11+λ−µw +
λ−µ
1+λ−µx, z), else return (w,
1
1+µ−λz +
µ−λ
1+µ−λy), where w, z as defined in
section 2.1.3.
5. Otherwise, find ε∗1, ε
∗
2 (see 2.1.7). Then, find the best direction (x
′, y′) using
the primal linear program, and move to a point
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
, where
ε = δδ+1/min{ε∗1 ,ε∗2 ,1/4} . Go to step 2.
From our analysis in subsection 2.1.3 we can see that in the case that
we are in a δ-stationary point and without loss of generality λ ≥ µ, we
can bound the regret of the function as f(x, y) ≤ λ + δ, and f(x, y) ≤
µ+ δ. So, if we return the strategy profile
(
1
1+λ−µw+
λ−µ
1+λ−µx, z
)
it implies
that λ + δ > 0.3393 + δ, which implies that λ > 0.3393, and µ + δ >
0.3393 + δ, which implies that µ > 0.3393. However for this interval of
values, f
(
1
1+λ−µw +
λ−µ
1+λ−µx, z
)
= 1−µ1+λ−µ ≤ 0.3393. So, in any case our
algorithm returns an additive (0.3393 + δ)-Nash equilibrium.
2.1.6 How to equalize the regrets
In every step of the steepest descent algorithm we make the regrets of the
players equal. Consider a strategy profile (x, y) where the regrets of the
players are not equal. We assume without loss of generality that fR(x, y) >
fC(x, y). In order to equalize the regrets we propose the following linear
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program:
minimize max(Ry)− (x′)TRy
s.t. max(Ry)− (x′)TRy ≥ max
(
(x′)TC
)
− (x′)TCy
The fact that the function f is continuous and the fact that there is a
best-response strategy, imply that there is a strategy x′, the solution of
the linear program, that equalizes the two regrets. Also, we can see that
f(x′, y) ≤ f(x, y), since (x, y) is in the feasible area of the LP. The case of
fC(x, y) > fR(x, y) is analogous.
2.1.7 Running time of the descent
We will prove the following Theorem which we use to prove that the algo-
rithm has polynomial running time.
Theorem 2.7 If we move from a non δ-stationary (x, y) with equal regrets
to a point
(
(1 − ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
, where (x′, y′) is the solution of the
primal linear program, for any ε ≤ min
{
δ
δ+1/min{ε∗1,ε∗2} ,
δ
δ+4
}
, where ε∗1, ε∗2
are some constants ∈ (0, 1], it holds that
f
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y) ≤ ε
(
V − f(x, y)
)
+ 2ε2,
where V = max
{
VR = maxM(Ry)
(Ry′)− (x′)TRy − xTRy′ + xTRy,
VC = maxM(xTC)
(
(x′)TC
)
− (x′)TCy − xTCy′ + xTCy
}
.
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Proof. By 2.1 the difference of the regrets is equal to
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y) =
= max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
+ max
{
0, max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
− max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))}
− xTRy − ε2xTRy + 2εxTRy − εxTRy′
+ ε2xTRy′ − ε(x′)TRy + ε2(x′)TRy − ε2(x′)TRy′ − f(x, y),
this implies that
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y) ≤
≤ (1− ε) max
M(Ry)
(Ry) + ε max
M(Ry)
(Ry′) + max
{
0, max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
− max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1−ε)y+εy′
))}
−xTRy−ε2xTRy+2εxTRy−εxTRy′+ε2xTRy′
−ε(x′)TRy+ε2(x′)TRy−ε2(x′)TRy′−f(x, y) = −ε max
M(Ry)
(Ry)+ε max
M(Ry)
(Ry′)
+max
{
0, max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1−ε)y+εy′
))
− max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1−ε)y+εy′
))}
−ε2xTRy
+ 2εxTRy − εxTRy′ + ε2xTRy′ − ε(x′)TRy + ε2(x′)TRy − ε2(x′)TRy′.
The inequality holds since maxM(Ry)
(
R
(
(1−ε)y+εy′
))
≤ (1−ε) maxM(Ry)
(Ry) + εmaxM(Ry)(Ry′) and the equality holds since f(x, y) = fR(x, y) =
max(Ry)−xTRy and maxM(Ry)(Ry) = max(Ry). Now, since −ε2xTRy ≤ 0,
−ε2(x′)TRy′ ≤ 0, xTRy′ ≤ 1, and (x′)TRy ≤ 1 we have
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y) ≤
≤ −ε max
M(Ry)
(Ry) + ε max
M(Ry)
(Ry′) + max
{
0, max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
− max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))}
+ 2εxTRy − εxTRy′ − ε(x′)TRy + 2ε2
= ε
(
VR − f(x, y)
)
+ 2ε2 + max
{
0, max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
− max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))}
.
35
The equality holds by the definition of VR and f(x, y). We will prove that
there is ε > 0 such that maxM(Ry)
(
R
(
(1−ε)y+εy′
))
−maxM(Ry)
(
R
(
(1−
ε)y + εy′
))
< 0. But,
max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
− max
M(Ry)
(
R
(
(1− ε)y + εy′
))
≤ (1− ε) max
M(Ry)
(Ry) + ε max
M(Ry)
(Ry′)− max
M(Ry)
(
R(1− ε)y
)
− max
M(Ry)
(
R(εy′)
)
≤ (1− ε) max
M(Ry)
(Ry) + ε max
M(Ry)
(Ry′)− max
M(Ry)
(
R(1− ε)y
)
= (1− ε) max
M(Ry)
(Ry) + ε max
M(Ry)
(Ry′)− (1− ε) max
M(Ry)
(Ry). (2.20)
The first inequality comes from the fact that maxM(Ry)
(
R
(
(1 − ε)y +
εy′
))
≤ (1− ε) maxM(Ry)(Ry) + εmaxM(Ry)(Ry′), and maxM(Ry)
(
R
(
(1−
ε)y + εy′
))
= maxM(Ry)
(
R(1 − ε)y
)
+ maxM(Ry)
(
R(εy′)
)
, since all the
strategies that belong to M(Ry) are best-response strategies, so they have
the same expected payoff. The second inequality holds by the property that
maxM(Ry)
(
R(εy′)
)
≥ 0. By definition we know that maxM(Ry)(Ry) <
maxM(Ry)(Ry). Let ε∗1 > 0 be a constant such that maxM(Ry)(Ry) =
(1− ε∗1) maxM(Ry)(Ry). Then, 2.20 becomes
(1− ε) max
M(Ry)
(Ry) + ε max
M(Ry)
(Ry′)− (1− ε) max
M(Ry)
(Ry) =
= (1− ε)(1− ε∗1) maxM(Ry)(Ry) + ε maxM(Ry)
(Ry′)− (1− ε) max
M(Ry)
(Ry)
= −(1− ε)ε∗1 maxM(Ry)(Ry) + ε maxM(Ry)
(Ry′)
< −(1− ε)ε∗1δ + ε,
the last inequality holds since maxM(Ry)(Ry
′) ≤ 1 and since our algo-
rithm has not found a (0.3393 + δ)-Nash equilibrium, the regret in the
point (x, y) is greater than (0.3393 + δ), so f(x, y) > 0.3393 + δ, this
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implies that maxM(Ry)(Ry) − xTRy > 0.3393 + δ, and this implies that
−maxM(Ry)(Ry) < −xTRy − 0.3393 − δ < −δ, since xTRy ≥ 0. This
expression −(1 − ε)ε∗1δ + ε is non-positive when ε ≤ δδ+1/ε∗1 . In this case
fR
(
(1 − ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y) ≤ ε
(
VR − f(x, y)
)
+ 2ε2. We do the
same analysis for the column player and we find another constant ε∗2 > 0
and we get for any ε ≤ δδ+1/ε∗2
fC
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y) ≤ ε
(
VC − f(x, y)
)
+ 2ε2.
So, there is a constant ε∗ = min
{
ε∗1, ε∗2
}
such that we have that for any
ε ≤ min{ δδ+1/ε∗ , δδ+4}
f
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y) =
= max
{
fR
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y), fC
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y)
}
≤ max
{
ε
(
VR − f(x, y)
)
+ 2ε2, ε
(
VC − f(x, y)
)
+ 2ε2
}
= ε(max
{
VR, VC
}
− f(x, y)) + 2ε2 = ε
(
V − f(x, y)
)
+ 2ε2. (2.21)
It is easy to see that if min
{
ε∗1, ε∗2
}
> 1/4, then δδ+4 <
δ
δ+1/min
{
ε∗1,ε
∗
2
} . So,
2.21 holds for any ε ≤ min
{
δ
δ+1/min
{
ε∗1,ε
∗
2
} , δδ+4}. uunionsq
Let k = 1
min
{
ε∗1,ε
∗
2
} . For any ε ≤ min{ δδ+k , δδ+4}, this implies that
δ ≥ max
{
kε
1−ε ,
4ε
1−ε
}
. We assume without loss of generality that k ≥ 4,
so ε ≤ δδ+k and δ ≥ kε1−ε . However, we are not in a δ-stationary point, so
V − f(x, y) < −δ, it is easy to see that if V − f(x, y) ≥ −δ, then for any
direction (x′, y′), since V is the minimum in the solution of the primal linear
program, we have ∇(x′,y′)f(x, y) ≥ −δ, so we are in a δ-stationary point and
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this is a contradiction. Thus,
V − f(x, y) < −δ,(
V − f(x, y)
)
(ε− 1) > kε,
0 >
(
V − f(x, y)
)
+ kε− εV + εf(x, y),
0 > ε
(
V − f(x, y)
)
+ kε2 − ε2V + ε2f(x, y),
0 > ε
(
V − f(x, y)
)
+ kε2 − 2ε2 + ε2f(x, y),
−ε2f(x, y) > ε
(
V − f(x, y)
)
+ (k − 2)ε2 ≥ ε
(
V − f(x, y)
)
+ 2ε2
≥ f
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
− f(x, y),
this implies that (1 − ε2)f(x, y) > f
(
(1 − ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
. The fifth
inequality holds since V ≤ 2 and the seventh inequality holds since k ≥ 4.
For ε = δδ+k we have
(
1−
(
δ
δ + k
)2)
f(x, y) > f
(
(1− ε)(x, y) + ε(x′, y′)
)
. (2.22)
So, in every iteration by 2.22 we have
f(x, y)−f
(
(1−ε)(x, y)+ε(x′, y′)
)
>
(
δ
δ + k
)2
f(x, y) ≥
(
δ
δ + k
)2
0.3393,
since we do iterations until f(x, y) ≥ 0.3393 + δ ≥ 0.3393. But in total, we
will stop when f(x, y) ≤ 0.3393 + δ, so we will do at most
1− (0.3393 + δ)(
δ
δ+k
)2
0.3393
<
1− 0.3393(
δ
δ+k
)2
0.3393
≤ O(1/δ2) number of iterations.
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2.2 New techniques for additive approximate Nash
equilibria
In this section, we will present a new technique based on zero-sum games
that gives the same approximation bound as [22, 7], equal to 3−
√
5
2 , for
additive ε-Nash equilibria. This technique is also used in the paper [13].
Also, we give a similar technique to this technique that gives additive 12 -well-
supported Nash equilibria under some conditions. Results of this section are
also presented in [15, 13].
2.2.1 Additive ε-Nash equilibria
Let (R,−R) and (−C,C) be two zero-sum games, with R,C ∈ [0, 1]n×n. Let
(x∗, y∗) and (xˆ, yˆ) be Nash equilibria of the former zero-sum game and the
latter zero-sum game, respectively. The value of the former zero-sum game
is vR = (x
∗)TRy∗ and for the latter is vC = (xˆ)TCyˆ. We assume without
loss of generality that vR ≥ vC .
We are now working on the (R,C) game. Let j be a best-response
strategy of the column player to the strategy x∗ of the row player, and let r
be a best-response strategy of the row player to the strategy j of the column
player. Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.8 The strategy profile ( 12−vRx
∗ + 1−vR2−vR r, j) is an additive
1−vR
2−vR -
Nash equilibrium for the game (R,C).
Proof. The maximum incentive to deviate for the row player in (x∗, j) is
fR(x
∗, j) ≤ 1 − vR, since (x∗)TRek ≥ vR, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n} by the
Nash equilibrium definition in zero-sum games. The maximum incentive to
deviate for the row player in (r, j) is fR(r, j) = 0, since r is a best-response
strategy to the strategy j. So, by the Lemma 1.11, the maximum regret of
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the row player is at most
1
2− vR fR(x
∗, j) +
1− vR
2− vR fR(r, j) ≤
1− vR
2− vR .
The maximum incentive to deviate for the column player in (x∗, j) is fC(x∗, j)
= 0, since j is a best-response strategy to the strategy x∗. The maximum
incentive to deviate for the column player in (r, j) is fC(r, j) ≤ 1. Therefore,
by Lemma 1.11, the maximum regret of the column player is at most
1
2− vR fC(x
∗, j) +
1− vR
2− vR fC(r, j) ≤
1− vR
2− vR .
uunionsq
Now, we will prove a result that it was also proved in [31].
Lemma 2.9 The strategy profile (xˆ, y∗) is an additive vR-well-supported
Nash equilibrium, and hence also an additive vR-Nash equilibrium for the
game (R,C).
Proof. By the Nash equilibrium definition the strategy y∗ prevents exceed-
ing vR and the strategy xˆ prevents exceeding vC ≤ vR.
uunionsq
Lemma 2.8 and 2.9 allow us to give an alternative proof of the follow-
ing theorem, first proved by [7, 22]. We will use this new technique for
computing additive 3−
√
5
2 -Nash equilibria in Chapter 6.
Theorem 2.10 For any bimatrix game (R,C) in [0, 1]n×n, there is a polyno-
mial-time algorithm to compute an additive 3−
√
5
2 -Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Lemma 2.8 and 2.9 give two constructions for computing additive
ε-Nash equilibria in polynomial time. The function 1−vR2−vR is a decreasing
function of vR and vR is an increasing function of vR. The two approximation
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bounds are equal when vR =
3−√5
2 . Therefore, if vR ∈ [0, 3−
√
5
2 ] return
(xˆ, y∗), else return ( 12−vRx
∗ + 1−vR2−vR r, j). This gives an additive
3−√5
2 -Nash
equilibrium. uunionsq
2.2.2 Additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibria
Let (−R,R) and (C,−C) be two zero-sum games. Let (x∗, y∗) and (xˆ, yˆ) be
Nash equilibria of the first zero-sum game and the second zero-sum game
respectively. The values of the zero-sum games are uR = (x
∗)TRy∗ for
the former and uC = (xˆ)
TCyˆ for the latter. We assume, without loss of
generality, that uR ≥ uC .
Lemma 2.11 The strategy profile (xˆ, y∗) is an additive (1−uC)-well-suppor-
ted Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The incentive of the row player to deviate from any strategy i is
1 − eTi Ry∗ ≤ 1 − uR ≤ 1 − uC , since eTi Ry∗ ≥ uR by the Nash equilibrium
definition in zero-sum games, and uR ≥ uC . The incentive of the column
player to deviate from any strategy i is 1−xˆTCei ≤ 1−uC , since xˆTCei ≥ uC
by the Nash equilibrium definition in zero-sum games. uunionsq
Let (R,C) be a bimatrix game with values in [0, 1]. Consider two
zero-sum games (R,−R) with a Nash equilibrium (x∗1, y∗1) and value vR =
(x∗1)TRy∗1, and (−R,R) with a Nash equilibrium (x∗2, y∗2) and value uR =
(x∗2)TRy∗2 for the row player. Also, consider two zero-sum games (−C,C)
with a Nash equilibrium (xˆ1, yˆ1) and value vC = xˆ1
TCyˆ1, and (C,−C) with
a Nash equilibrium (xˆ2, yˆ2) and value uC = xˆ2
TCyˆ2.
Lemma 2.12 If uR ≥ vR and uC ≥ vC , then we can find an additive 12 -
well-supported-Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. We have four cases of analysis:
• vR ≤ uR ≤ 12 and vC ≤ uC ≤ 12 ,
• vR ≤ uR ≤ 12 and uC ≥ 12 ,
• uR ≥ 12 and vC ≤ uC ≤ 12 ,
• uR ≥ 12 and uC ≥ 12 .
In the first case, return the strategy profile (xˆ1, y
∗
1). For every i, e
T
i Ry
∗
1 ≤ 12 ,
so the incentive of the row player to deviate is at most 12 . For the column
player, for every i we have xˆ1
TCei ≤ 12 , so the incentive of the column
player to deviate is at most 12 . Thus, this is an additive
1
2 -well-supported
Nash equilibrium.
In the second case, return the strategy profile (xˆ2, y
∗
1). For every i we
have eTi Ry
∗
1 ≤ 12 , so the incentive of the row player to deviate is at most 12 .
For the column player, for every i the incentive to deviate is 1− xˆ2TCei ≤ 12 ,
since by the Nash equilibrium definition for every i, we have xˆ2
TCei ≥ uC ≥
1
2 . It follows that (xˆ2, y
∗
1) is an additive
1
2 -well-supported Nash equilibrium.
In the third case, return the strategy profile (xˆ1, y
∗
2). For the row player,
for every i the incentive to deviate is 1 − eTi Ry∗2 ≤ 12 , since by the Nash
equilibrium definition for every i, we have eTi Ry
∗
2 ≥ uR ≥ 12 . For the column
player, for every i we have that xˆ1
TCei ≤ 12 , so the incentive to deviate is
at most 12 . Thus, (xˆ1, y
∗
2) is an additive
1
2 -well-supported Nash equilibrium.
In the fourth case, return the strategy profile (xˆ2, y
∗
2). For the row
player, for every i the incentive to deviate is 1 − eTi Ry∗2 ≤ 12 , since by the
Nash equilibrium definition for every i, we have eTi Ry
∗
2 ≥ uR ≥ 12 . For the
column player for every i the incentive to deviate is 1 − xˆ2TCei ≤ 12 , since
by the Nash equilibrium definition for every i, we have xˆ2
TCei ≥ uC ≥ 12 ,
so (xˆ2, y
∗
2) is an additive
1
2 -well-supported Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
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Combining conclusions of Lemma 2.8 and Lemma 2.9, we can prove the
following Theorem.
Theorem 2.13 There is a polynomial-time algorithm that for every bima-
trix game with values in [0, 1], either computes an additive 13 -Nash equilib-
rium, or an additive 12 -well-supported Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let without loss of generality assume that vR ≥ vC . If vR ≥ 12 ,
then by Lemma 2.8 we can find an additive 1−vR2−vR -Nash equilibrium. But,
the function 1−vR2−vR is a decreasing function of vR, it achieves its maximum
for vR =
1
2 , where its value is
1
3 . If on the other hand vR ≤ 12 , by Lemma
2.9 we can find an additive 12 -well-supported Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
Lemma 2.14 If the payoff matrix R is symmetric, then the values uR and
vR are equal.
Proof. Let (x∗1, y∗1) be a Nash equilibrium of the game (R,−R). Then by
the definition of Nash equilibrium strategy x∗1 maximizes the minimum of the
expected payoff of the row player in every strategy of the column player, and
strategy y∗1 minimizes the maximum of the expected payoff of the row player
in every strategy of the row player. However, if (x∗2, y∗2) is a Nash equilibrium
of the game (−R,R), then by the definitions of Nash equilibrium strategy
x∗2 minimizes the maximum of the expected payoff of the row player in every
strategy of the column player, and strategy y∗2 maximizes the minimum of
the expected payoff of the row player in every strategy of the row player.
But, since the payoff matrix is symmetric, we have that
vR = max
x∈[0,1]n
min
i
xTRei = max
y∈[0,1]n
min
i
(ei)
TRy = uR.
uunionsq
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Theorem 2.15 There is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an ad-
ditive 12 -well-supported-Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games in which both
payoff matrices are symmetric.
Proof. If both payoff matrices are symmetric, then by Theorem 2.14, we
have vR = uR and vC = uC . It then follows from Lemma 2.12 that an
additive 12 -well-supported Nash equilibrium can be output in polynomial
time. uunionsq
2.3 Hardness results
Inspired by the previous approximation results in games with symmetric
payoff matrices (see Theorem 2.15), we give some hardness results in bima-
trix games where at least of one of the payoff matrices is symmetric. These
results are also presented in [15].
Theorem 2.16 Let (R,C) be a bimatrix game in which exactly one of the
payoff matrices is symmetric, then computing a Nash equilibrium in this
game is PPAD-hard.
Proof. For the proof of this Theorem we will do a similar reduction as the
reduction in [29]. Consider an arbitrary bimatrix game with payoff matrices
(A,B) ∈ (0, 1)n×n.
We define a payoff matrix R such that in every position for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} we put Rij = 1 and in every position for i ∈ {n +
1, . . . , 2n} and j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n} we put Rij = 0, in every position for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n} we put Rij = Ai(j−n) and in every
position for i ∈ {n+1, . . . , 2n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} we put Rij = AT(n−i)j . So,
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we have the payoff matrix
R =
 1s A
AT 0s
 .
We define the payoff matrix C as in every position for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
j ∈ {1, . . . , n} we put Cij = 0 and in every position for i ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n}
and j ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , 2n} we put Cij = 1, in every position for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n} we put Cij = Bi(j−n) and in every position for
i ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , 2n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} we put Cij = 0. So we have
C =
0s B
0s 1s
 .
It is easy to see that the payoff matrix R is the only symmetric payoff matrix.
Let (x1y1, x2y2) be a Nash equilibrium of the game (R,C), where x1, x2 are
the parts of the mixed strategy probability distributions for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and y1, y2 are the parts of the mixed strategy probability distributions for
i ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n}, and j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n}, respectively. We have that
n∑
i=1
x1(i) +
2n∑
i=n+1
y1(i) = 1 and
n∑
j=1
x2(j) +
2n∑
j=n+1
y2(j) = 1. We can see that
2n∑
i=n+1
y1(i) = 0 since any pure strategy for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is strictly dominant
to any strategy in the support of y1, since the elements of A belongs to (0, 1).
Also,
n∑
j=1
x2(j) = 0 since any pure strategy for j ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , 2n} is strictly
dominant to any strategy in the support of x2, since the elements of B
belongs to (0, 1). Thus, any Nash equilibrium of the game (R,C) is also a
Nash equilibrium of the arbitrary game (A,B). uunionsq
Theorem 2.17 Let (R,C) ∈ [0, 1]n×n be a bimatrix game in which both of
the payoff matrices are symmetric, then computing a Nash equilibrium in
this game is PPAD-hard.
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Proof. For the proof of this Theorem we will do a similar reduction as
the reduction in Theorem 2.16. Let an arbitrary bimatrix game with payoff
matrices (A,B) ∈ (0, 1)n×n.
We define a payoff matrix R such that in every position for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} we put Rij = 1 and in every position for i ∈ {n +
1, . . . , 2n} and j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n} we put Rij = 0, in every position for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n} we put Rij = Ai(j−n) and in every
position for i ∈ {n+1, . . . , 2n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} we put Rij = AT(n−i)j . So,
we have the payoff matrix
R =
 1s A
AT 0s
 .
We define the payoff matrix C as in every position for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
j ∈ {1, . . . , n} we put Cij = 0 and in every position for i ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n}
and j ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , 2n} we put Cij = 1, in every position for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n} we put Cij = Bi(j−n) and in every position for
i ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , 2n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} we put Cij = BT(i−n)j . So we have
C =
 0s B
BT 1s
 .
It is easy to see that both payoff matricesR,C are symmetric. Let (x1y1, x2y2)
be a Nash equilibrium of the game (R,C), where x1, x2 are the parts of
the mixed strategy probability distributions for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and y1, y2
are the parts of the mixed strategy probability distributions for i ∈ {n +
1, . . . , 2n}, and j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n}, respectively. We have that
n∑
i=1
x1(i) +
2n∑
i=n+1
y1(i) = 1 and
n∑
j=1
x2(j)+
2n∑
j=n+1
y2(j) = 1. We can see that
2n∑
i=n+1
y1(i) =
0 since any pure strategy for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is strictly dominant to any strat-
egy in the support of y1, since the elements of A belongs to (0, 1). Also,
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n∑
j=1
x2(j) = 0 since any pure strategy for j ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , 2n} is strictly dom-
inant to any strategy in the support of x2, since the elements of B belongs
to (0, 1). Thus, any Nash equilibrium of the game (R,C) is also a Nash
equilibrium of the arbitrary game (A,B). uunionsq
2.4 Additive ε-well-supported NE in bimatrix
games
In this section, we study polynomial-time algorithms for computing addi-
tive ε-well-supported Nash equilibria in arbitrary bimatrix games. Firstly,
we give a new parametrized algorithm for computing additive 2/3-well-
supported Nash equilibria in arbitrary bimatrix games and then we give a
polynomial-time algorithm for computing an additive (12 +δ)-well-supported
Nash equilibrium in the special class of symmetric bimatrix games, for any
δ > 0.
Our simple parametrized algorithm depends on the opt value, where opt is
the maximum of the sum of the payoffs of the players, for computing additive
ε-well-supported Nash equilibria. This algorithm inspired the work of [13]
of improving the approximation bound for well-supported Nash equilibria in
bimatrix games. Actually, we prove that if opt ≥ 43 then we can efficiently
compute an additive (2−opt)-well-supported Nash equilibrium with constant
(size of one) support. If opt < 43 , then we can efficiently compute an additive
(opt/2)-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
Let (R,−R) and (−C,C) be the two zero-sum games with Nash equilib-
ria (x∗, y∗) and (xˆ, yˆ) respectively. The value of the first zero-sum game is
vR = (x
∗)TRy∗ and the value of the second zero-sum game is vC = (xˆ)TCyˆ.
We assume without loss of generality that vR ≥ vC . By the definition of
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Nash equilibrium we know that for every i = 1, . . . , n:
x∗TRei ≥ vR,
eTi Ry
∗ ≤ vR,
xˆTCei ≤ vC ,
∀j ∈ supp(x∗), vR = eTj Ry∗ ≥ eTi Ry∗.
Theorem 2.18 Let (R,C) be a bimatrix game with values in [0,1] and opt be
the maximum value of the sum Rij +Cij for any pair (i, j). Then if opt ≥ 43 ,
the pure strategy profile that the sum of the entries is opt is an additive
(2 − opt)-well-supported Nash equilibrium. Else if opt < 43 and uR ≤ opt/2
then (xˆ, y∗) is an additive (opt/2)-well-supported Nash equilibrium. Else,
(x∗, y∗) is an additive (opt/2)-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We divide our proof in two cases:
• If opt ≥ 43 , then there is a strategy profile (i, j) such that Rij + Cij =
opt. This is an additive (2−opt)-well-supported Nash equilibrium. The
maximum best-responses to the (i, j) for both players can be one so
this strategy profile is an additive max{1−Rij , 1−Cij}-well-supported
Nash equilibrium. We assume without loss of generality that Rij ≤
Cij , so 1−Rij = max{1−Rij , 1−Cij} = 1 +Cij − opt ≤ 2− opt. So,
it is an additive (2− opt)-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
• If opt < 43 , we separate the analysis in two cases :
– If uR ≤ opt/2, return (xˆ, y∗). By the Nash equilibrium definition
and the fact that opt/2 ≥ uR ≥ uC , this is an additive opt/2-well-
supported Nash equilibrium.
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– Else return (x∗, y∗). Then, by the Nash equilibrium definition
∀j ∈ supp(x∗),∀i, uR = eTj Ry∗ ≥ eTi Ry∗. Also,
Cij ≤ opt−Rij ⇒ x∗TCej ≤ opt− x∗TRej (2.23)
But, ∀j, x∗TRej ≥ uR ≥ opt/2, and therefore (2.23) implies
x∗TCej ≤ opt− x∗TRej < opt/2. Thus, this is an additive opt/2-
well-supported Nash equilibrium.
uunionsq
2.5 Additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibria in
symmetric bimatrix games
In this section we study the computation of additive ε-well-supported Nash
equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games, a class of bimatrix games in which
swapping the roles of the two players does not change the payoff matrices,
that is if the payoff matrix of one is the transpose of the payoff matrix of the
other. Symmetric games are an important class of games in game theory;
their applications include auctions and congestion games. They have already
been studied by John Nash in his seminal paper in which he introduced the
concept of a Nash equilibrium; he proved that every symmetric game has at
least one symmetric Nash equilibrium, that is one in which all players use
the same mixed strategy [45]. Results of this section are also presented in
[16].
Computing Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games is known to be
as hard as computing Nash equilibria in arbitrary bimatrix games because
there is a polynomial-time reduction from the latter to the former [29, 46, 19].
In contrast to arbitrary bimatrix games, it is known how to compute addi-
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tive (1/3 + δ)-Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games in polynomial-
time, where δ > 0 is arbitrarily small [39]. In this section we improve our
understanding of the approximability of Nash equilibria in symmetric bima-
trix games by considering the task of computing additive ε-well-supported
Nash equilibria. Our main result is an algorithm that computes additive
(1/2 + δ)-well-supported Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games in
polynomial-time, where δ > 0 is arbitrarily small (Theorem 2.21).
Our (1/2 + δ)-approximation algorithm splits the analysis into two cases
that are then considered independently. The first case is based on the fol-
lowing relaxation of the concept of a symmetric Nash equilibrium: we say
that a strategy profile (x, x) prevents exceeding u ∈ [0, 1] if the expected
payoff of every pure strategy in the symmetric game is at most u when the
other player uses strategy x. This is indeed a relaxation of the concept
of the symmetric Nash equilibrium because if (x∗, x∗) is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium then it prevents exceeding its value (that is, the expected payoff
each player gets when they both play strategy x∗). Moreover, we show that
this relaxation of a symmetric Nash equilibrium is algorithmically tractable
because it suffices to solve a single linear program to find a strategy profile
(x, x) that prevents exceeding u, if there is one. The first case in our algo-
rithm is to solve this linear program for u = 1/2 and if it succeeds then we
can immediately report an additive 1/2-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
Note that by the above, if there is indeed a symmetric Nash equilibrium
with value 1/2 or smaller, then the linear program does have a solution.
If the first case in the algorithm fails to identify an additive 1/2-well-
supported Nash equilibrium because the game has no symmetric Nash equi-
librium with value 1/2 or smaller, then we consider the other, and technically
more challenging case. We use another relaxation of the concept of a sym-
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metric Nash equilibrium: we say that a strategy profile (x, y) well supports
u ∈ [0, 1] if the expected payoff of every pure strategy in the support of x is
at least u when the other player uses strategy y, and the expected payoff of
every pure strategy in the support of y is at least u when the other player
uses strategy x. We observe that if a strategy profile (x, y) well supports u
then it is an additive (1 − u)-well-supported Nash equilibrium, so in order
to provide a latter it is sufficient to find a former.
Therefore, in order to obtain an additive (1/2 + δ)-well-supported Nash
equilibrium, we are interested in finding a strategy profile (x, y) that well
supports u ≥ 1/2− δ. While it may not be easy to verify if there is such a
strategy profile, let alone find one, both can be achieved in polynomial-time
by solving a single linear program if we happen to know the supports of
strategies of each player in such a strategy profile. The obvious technical
obstacle to algorithmic tractability here is that the number of all possible
supports to consider is exponential in the number of pure strategies. We
overcome this difficulty by proving the main technical result of the subsection
(Theorem 2.19) that for every symmetric Nash equilibrium (x∗, x∗) and for
every δ > 0 establishes existence of a strategy profile (x, y), with both
strategies having supports of constant size, that well supports u∗− δ, where
u∗ is the value of the Nash equilibrium. Note that by the failure of the first
case every symmetric Nash equilibrium has value larger than 1/2, and hence
Theorem 2.19 implies that there is such a strategy profile with constant-size
supports that well supports 1/2 − δ. The second case of our algorithm is
to solve the linear programs mentioned above for u = 1/2 − δ and for all
supports I and J of sizes at most κ(δ)—where κ(δ) is a constant (which
depends on δ, but does not depend on the number n of pure strategies) that
is specified in Theorem 2.19—and to output a solution (x, y) as soon as one
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is found.
In order to prove our main technical result (Theorem 2.19) we use the
probabilistic method to prove existence of constant-support strategy profiles
that nearly well support the expected payoffs of a Nash equilibrium. Our
construction and proof are inspired by the construction of Daskalakis et
al. [22] used by them to compute additive (3 − √5)/2-Nash equilibria in
bimatrix games in polynomial-time, but our analysis is different and more
involved because we need to guarantee the extra condition of nearly well
supporting the equilibrium values. The general idea of using sampling and
Hoeffding bounds to prove existence of approximate equilibria with small
supports dates back to the papers of Althofer [1] and Lipton et al. [42], who
have shown that strategies with supports of size O(log n/ε2) are necessary
for additive ε-Nash equilibria in games with n strategies.
2.5.1 Computing additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibria
Fix a bimatrix game G = (R,C) for the rest of the section, where R,C ∈
[0, 1]n×n. We will use N to denote the number of bits needed to represent
the matrices R and C with all their entries represented in binary. We say
that a strategy x is k-uniform, for k ∈ N \ { 0 }, if x(i) ∈ {0, 1k , 2k , . . . , 1}, for
every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2.5.2 Strategies that well support the payoffs of Nash equi-
libria
The following theorem states that the payoffs of every Nash equilibrium can
be nearly well supported by a strategy profile with supports of constant size.
Theorem 2.19 Let (x∗, y∗) be a Nash equilibrium. For every δ > 0, there
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are κ(δ)-uniform strategies x, y such that the strategy profile (x, y) well sup-
ports
(
(x∗)TRy∗ − δ, (x∗)TCy∗ − δ), where κ(δ) = d2 ln(1/δ)/δ2e.
The proof of this technical result is postponed until Section 2.5.4.
Let v, u ∈ [0, 1], δ > 0, and let I and J be multisets of pure strate-
gies of size κ(δ). Consider the following system WS(v, u, I,J , δ) of linear
constraints:
x(i) = ki/κ(δ) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n;
y(j) = `j/κ(δ) for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n;
Ri•y ≥ v − δ for all i ∈ I;
xTC•j ≥ u− δ for all j ∈ J ;
where ki is the number of times i occurs in multiset I, and `j is the number
of times j occurs in multiset J . Note that the system WS(v, u, I,J , δ) of lin-
ear constraints characterizes κ(δ)-uniform strategy profiles (x, y), such that
supp(x) = I and supp(y) = J , that well support (v−δ, u−δ). Theorem 2.19
implies the following.
Corollary 2.20 If (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium, v ≤ xTRy, u ≤ xTCy, and
δ > 0, then there are multisets I and J from {1, 2, . . . , n} of size κ(δ), such
that WS(v, u, I,J , δ) has a solution and it well supports (v − δ, u− δ).
2.5.3 The algorithm for symmetric games
Propositions 1.14 and 1.16 suggest that in order to identify an additive
1/2-well-supported Nash equilibrium it suffices to find either a strategy pro-
file that prevents exceeding (1/2, 1/2) or one that well supports (1/2, 1/2).
Moreover, verifying existence and identifying such strategy profiles can be
done efficiently by solving the linear program PE(1/2, 1/2), and by solving
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linear programs WS(1/2 + δ, 1/2 + δ, I,J , δ) for all multisets I and J of
pure strategies of size κ(δ), respectively.
For arbitrary bimatrix games the above scheme may fail if none of these
systems of linear constraints has a solution. Note, however, that—by Propo-
sition 1.13 and Corollary 2.20—it would indeed succeed if we could guarantee
that the game had a Nash equilibrium with both payoffs at most 1/2, or with
both payoffs at least (1/2 + δ). Symmetric bimatrix games nearly satisfy
this requirement thanks to existence of symmetric Nash equilibria in every
symmetric game [45].
If (x∗, x∗) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in a symmetric bimatrix
game (R,RT ) then—trivially—either (x∗)TRx∗ ≤ 1/2 or (x∗)TRx∗ > 1/2.
In the former case, by Proposition 1.13 the linear program PE(1/2, 1/2)
has a solution, and by Proposition 1.14 it is an additive 1/2-well-supported
Nash equilibrium. In the latter case, by Corollary 2.20 there are multisets I
and J of pure strategies of size κ(δ), such that WS(1/2, 1/2, I,J , δ) has a
solution (x, y) and it well supports (1/2 − δ, 1/2 − δ). It then follows by
Proposition 1.16 that (x, y) is an additive (1/2 + δ)-well-supported Nash
equilibrium.
Algorithm 1 Let (R,RT ) be a symmetric game and let δ > 0.
1. If PE(1/2, 1/2) has a solution x then return (x, x).
2. Otherwise, that is if PE (1/2, 1/2) does not have a solution:
(a) Using exhaustive search, find multisets I and J of pure strategies,
both of size κ(δ), such that WS (1/2, 1/2, I,J , δ) has a solution.
(b) Return a solution (x, y) of WS (1/2, 1/2, I,J , δ). uunionsq
In order to find appropriate I and J in step 2(a), an exhaustive enumer-
ation of all pairs of multisets I and J of size κ(δ) is done, and for each such
54 CHAPTER 2. ADDITIVE APPROXIMATE NASH EQUILIBRIA
pair the system of linear constraints WS (1/2, 1/2, I,J , δ) is solved. Note
that the number of κ(δ)-element multisets from an n-element set is(
n+ κ(δ)− 1
κ(δ)
)
= nO(κ(δ)) = nO(ln(1/δ)/δ
2).
Therefore, step 2. of the algorithm requires solving nO(ln(1/δ)/δ2) linear pro-
grams and hence the algorithm runs in time NO(ln(1/δ)/δ2).
Theorem 2.21 For every δ > 0, Algorithm 1 runs in time NO(ln(1/δ)/δ2)
and it returns a strategy profile that is an additive (1/2 + δ)-well-supported
Nash equilibrium.
2.5.4 Proof of Theorem 2.19
We use the probabilistic method: random κ(δ)-uniform strategies are drawn
by sampling κ(δ) pure strategies (with replacement) from the distribu-
tions x∗ and y∗, respectively, and Hoeffding’s inequality is used to show
that the probability of thus selecting a strategy profile that well supports(
v∗ − δ, u∗ − δ) is positive if κ(δ) ≥ 2 ln(1/δ)/δ2, where v∗ = (x∗)TRy∗ and
u∗ = (x∗)TCy∗.
Consider 2κ(δ) mutually independent random variables It and Jt, 1 ≤
t ≤ κ(δ), with values in {1, 2, . . . , n}, the former with the same distribution
as strategy x∗ and the latter with the same distribution as strategy y∗, that
is we have P{It = i} = x∗i and P
{
Jt = j
}
= y∗j for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Define
the random distributions X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) and Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn),
with values in [0, 1]n, by setting:
Xi =
1
κ(δ)
·
κ(δ)∑
t=1
[It = i] and Yj =
1
κ(δ)
·
κ(δ)∑
t=1
[Jt = j].
Note that every realization of Y is a κ(δ)-uniform strategy that uses the pure
strategy j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, with probability Kj/κ(δ), where Kj =
∑κ(δ)
t=1 [Jt = j]
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is the number of indices t, 1 ≤ t ≤ κ(δ), for which Jt = j. A simi-
lar characterization holds for every realization of X. Observe also that
supp(X) ⊆ supp(x∗) and supp(Y ) ⊆ supp(y∗) because for all i and j,
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the random variables Xi and Yj are identically equal to 0
unless x∗i > 0 and y
∗
j > 0, respectively.
Since we want (a realization of) the random strategies X and Y to
well support a certain pair of values, we now characterize Ri•Y , for all
i ∈ supp(x∗); the whole reasoning presented below for Ri•Y can be carried
out analogously for XTC•j , for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n, and hence it is omitted.
First, observe that for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we have:
Ri•Y =
n∑
j=1
RijYj =
1
κ(δ)
·
n∑
j=1
Rij ·
κ(δ)∑
t=1
[Jt = j] =
1
κ(δ)
·
κ(δ)∑
t=1
RiJt .
Therefore, the random variable Ri•Y is equal to the arithmetic average
Zi =
1
κ(δ)
·
κ(δ)∑
t=1
Zit
of the independent random variables Zit = RiJt , 1 ≤ t ≤ κ(δ).
For every i ∈ supp(x∗), we will apply Hoeffding’s inequality to the cor-
responding random variable Zi. Hoeffding’s inequality gives an exponential
upper bound for the probability of large deviations of the arithmetic average
of independent and bounded random variables from their expectation.
Lemma 2.22 (Hoeffding’s inequality) Let Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk be independent
random variables with 0 ≤ Zt ≤ 1 for every t, let Z = (1/k) ·
∑k
t=1 Zt, and
let E
{
Z
}
be its expectation. Then for all δ > 0, we have P
{
Z − E{Z} ≤
−δ} ≤ e−2δ2k.
Before we apply Hoeffding’s inequality to the random variables Zi defined
above, observe that for every t = 1, 2, . . . , κ(δ), we have:
E{Zit} = E{RiJt} =
n∑
j=1
Rij · P{Jt = j} = Ri•y∗.
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Note, however, that if i ∈ supp(x∗) then E{Zit} = Ri•y∗ = v∗, because
(x∗, y∗) is a Nash equilibrium, and hence every i ∈ supp(x∗) is a best re-
sponse to y∗. It follows that E
{
Zi
}
= (1/κ(δ)) ·∑κ(δ)t=1 E{Zit} = v∗.
Applying Hoeffding’s inequality, for every i ∈ supp(x∗), we get:
P{Ri•Y < v∗ − δ} = P
{
Zi − E
{
Zi
}
< −δ} ≤ e−2δ2κ(δ). (2.24)
It follows that if I ⊆ supp(x∗) and |I| ≤ κ(δ), then:
P
{
Ri•Y < v∗ − δ for some i ∈ I
} ≤
≤
∑
i∈I
P
{
Ri•Y < v∗ − δ
} ≤ κ(δ) · e−2δ2κ(δ) = 2δ2 ln(1/δ) < 1
2
, (2.25)
for all δ > 0. The first inequality holds by the union bound, and the second
follows from (2.24) and because |I| ≤ κ(δ). The last inequality can be ver-
ified by observing that the function f(x) = 2x2 ln(1/x), for x > 0, achieves
its maximum at x = 1/
√
e and f(1/
√
e) = 1/e < 1/2.
In a similar way we can prove that if J ⊆ supp(y∗) and |J | ≤ κ(δ), then:
P
{
XTC•j < (x∗)TCy∗ − δ for some j ∈ J
}
<
1
2
, (2.26)
for all δ > 0.
We are now ready to argue that
P
{
Ri•Y ≥ v∗ − δ for all i ∈ supp(X),
and XTC•j ≥ u∗ − δ for all j ∈ supp(Y )
}
> 0,
and hence there must be realizations x, y ∈ [0, 1]n of the random variables
X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) and Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn), such that (x, y) well sup-
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ports
(
v∗ − δ, u∗ − δ). Indeed, we have:
P
{
Ri•Y < v∗ − δ for some i ∈ supp(X),
or XTC•j < u∗ − δ for some j ∈ supp(Y )
}
≤
∑
I⊆supp(x∗)
P
{
I = supp(X) and Ri•Y < v∗ − δ for some i ∈ I
}
+
∑
J⊆supp(y∗)
P
{
J = supp(Y ) and XTC•j < u∗ − δ for some j ∈ J
}
=
∑
I⊆supp(x∗)
|I|≤κ(δ)
P
{
I = supp(X)
}·P{Ri•Y < v∗−δ for some i ∈ I ∣∣ I = supp(X)}
+
∑
J⊆supp(y∗)
|J |≤κ(δ)
P
{
J = supp(Y )
}·P{XTC•j < u∗−δ for some j ∈ J ∣∣ J = supp(Y )}
<
∑
I⊆supp(x∗)
P
{
I = supp(X)
} · 1
2
+
∑
J⊆supp(y∗)
P
{
J = supp(Y )
} · 1
2
= 1,
where the first inequality follows from the union bound, and from supp(X) ⊆
supp(x∗) and supp(Y ) ⊆ supp(y∗); the equality holds because |supp(X)| ≤
κ(δ) and |supp(Y )| ≤ κ(δ) by the definitions of X and Y ; and the latter
(strict) inequality follows from (2.25) and (2.26).
2.6 Additive ε-Nash equilibria in symmetric multi-
player games
In this section, we note that we can obtain a slightly better approximation
bound for additive ε-Nash equilibria for symmetric multi-player games than
the general case using the recursive algorithm described earlier in [7, 9, 35].
The only observation is that if we have a symmetric m-player game, if we
fix any strategy of any player, then the subgame that is created is also a
symmetric game of m − 1 players. And since for bimatrix games we can
construct an additive (13 + δ)-Nash equilibrium, for any δ > 0, which is a
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better bound than the state of art for additive ε-Nash equilibria of 0.3393
[51], using the recursive method presented in [7, 9, 35], we obtain additive
(35 + δ)-Nash equilibria for three players for any δ > 0, additive (
5
7 + δ)-
Nash equilibria for four players for any δ > 0, and so on. In particular, by
applying Lemma 9 from [7], we obtain that for any fixed m and any δ > 0,
one can obtain an additive (1 − 22m−1 + δ)-Nash equilibrium in symmetric
game with m players. These results are also presented in [14].
2.7 Additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibria in
multi-player games
In this section, we will combine the approaches developed earlier in [42,
35, 5] for additive ε-Nash equilibria and the work of Kontogiannis and Spi-
rakis [38] for additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibria, to prove that for any
n-strategies m-player game and for any ε > 0, there is an ε-well-supported
Nash equilibrium with support of size O((lnm + lnn + ln(1/ε)/ε2))), as-
suming, wlog, that mn > 8. Results of this section are also presented in
[14].
Fix an m-player game. Let x = (xi, x−i) be a Nash equilibrium of the
game. Any player i can create an empirical distribution si from xi by taking
k ≥ d8(2(lnm+lnn)+ln(1/ε))/ε2e random samples independently according
to the distribution xi and then create a multiset Ai of pure strategies in
{1, . . . , n}. The probability of a pure strategy in the distribution si is the
number of the appearances in the multiset Ai divided by the total number
of samples k. By Lemma 3.4 from [5], for any strategy ` and any player i,
we obtain the following:
Pr
[|ui(e`, s−i)− ui(e`, x−i)| ≥ ε/2] ≤ 8e− ε2k8
ε
≤ 8
(mn)2
.
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We apply the union bound, to obtain that for the strategy profile s, we
have
1−
m∑
i=1
n∑
l=1
Pr
[
|ui(e`, s−i)− ui(e`, x−i)| ≥ ε/2
]
≥ 1− 8mn
(mn)2
= 1− 8
mn
> 0.
We apply this bound to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2.23 Consider an n-strategies m-player game. Let s be an em-
pirical strategy profile, created by sampling as described above with number
of samples equal to k ≥ d8(2(lnm + lnn) + ln(1/ε))/ε2e. Then s is an ad-
ditive ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium, with high probability, with support
of size O(lnm+ lnn+ ln(1/ε))/ε2.
Proof. By the definition of the Nash equilibrium, for any player i, for any
` ∈ supp(si), `′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, since supp(si) ⊆ supp(xi), we have that any
strategy ` ∈ supp(si) is a best-response strategy to x−i, and therefore,
ui(e`, x−i) ≥ ui(e`′ , x−i). (2.27)
If we have two strategies `, `′ such that ` ∈ supp(si) and `′ /∈ supp(si),
then
ui(e`, s−i) ≥ ui(e`, x−i)− ε/2
≥ ui(e`′ , x−i)− ε/2 ≥ ui(e`′ , s−i)− ε,
where the first and the third inequality holds by the fact that |ui(e`, s−i)−
ui(e`, x−i)| ≤ ε/2 and |ui(e`′ , s−i) − ui(e`′ , x−i)| ≤ ε/2, respectively, and
the second inequality holds by (2.27). This implies that ui(e`, s−i) + ε ≥
ui(e`′ , s−i).
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Let us now consider two strategies `, `′ ∈ supp(si). Then, similarly, we
have
ui(e`, s−i) ≤ ε/2 + ui(e`, x−i) = ε/2 + ui(e`′ , x−i)
≤ ui(e`′ , s−i) + ε,
where the inequalities hold because |ui(e`, s−i) − ui(e`, x−i)| ≤ ε/2 and
|ui(e`′ , s−i) − ui(e`′ , x−i)| ≤ ε/2 and the equality holds since `, `′ are best-
response strategies to x−i, since they belong to supp(si) ⊆ supp(xi). uunionsq
2.8 Additive approximate Nash equilibria in ran-
dom multi-player games
In this section we will generalize the approach of [47] who gave a simple proof
that random bimatrix games are easy to solve (see also [6]) to multi-player
normal-form games. These results are also presented in [14].
We consider an n-strategies m-player random normal-form game. In a
random game, every entry in all of the payoff matrices is drawn indepen-
dently according to some probability distribution over the interval [0, 1]. We
will require that for any player i the probability distributions, with which
the entries are taken, have the same mean value µi. That is, for any player
i, for any strategy profile s, E[ui(s)] = µi.
A fully uniform distribution is a mixed strategy in which player plays
every pure strategy with probability 1n . We will prove that, for any ε > 0,
with high probability the fully uniform distribution is an additive ε-Nash
equilibrium and an additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
Our analysis will rely on the classic Hoeffding’s inequality.
Lemma 2.24 [36] Let Y1, . . . , Y`, Z1, . . . , Zr be independent random vari-
ables in the interval [a, b]. Let Y¯ = Y1+···+Y`` and Z¯ =
Z1+···+Zr
r . Then for
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any t > 0,
Pr
[
(Y¯ − Z¯)− (E[Y¯ ]− E[Z¯]) ≥ t
]
≤ e−2t2/(( 1`+ 1r )(b−a)2).
2.8.1 Additive ε-Nash equilibria in random multi-player
games
First, we do the analysis for additive ε-Nash equilibria. The idea is to apply
Hoeffding’s inequality to show that for any player i, if she plays according
to the fully uniform distribution, then if she changes her strategy then her
utility will not change by more than ε. (We do not need to assume that ε
is constant and the proof works for any ε ≥
√
ln(nm)
nm−1 .)
Theorem 2.25 Consider an n-strategies m-player random normal-form game
and let ε > 0. Then with high probability, the strategy profile x = (x, . . . , x)
is an additive ε-Nash equilibrium, where x is a fully uniform distribution.
Proof. Let us introduce some useful notation, and define
Ai =
n∑
j1=1
n∑
j2=1
· · ·
n∑
jm=1
ui(ej1 , ej2 , . . . , ejm),
Yi,k =
∑
1≤j1,...,ji−1,
ji+1,...,jm≤n
ui(ej1 , . . . , eji−1 , ek, eji+1 , . . . , ejm), and
Zi,k = Ai − Yi,k.
Observe that for every player i, we have
ui(x) = ui(x,x−i) =
1
nm
Ai,
and similarly, for every player i and every strategy k,
ui(ek,x−i) =
1
nm−1
Yi,k.
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Further, after rearranging, we obtain
ui(ek,x−i)− ui(x,x−i) = n− 1
nm
Yi,k − 1
nm
Zi,k
=
n− 1
n
·
(
1
nm−1
Yi,k − 1
(n− 1)nm−1Zi,k
)
. (2.28)
Now, we will bound the probability that for a given player i and strat-
egy k, we have ui(ek,x−i) − ui(x,x−i) ≥ ε. We first want to provide the
platform for the use of Hoeffding’s inequality (Lemma 2.24). Notice that
all entries ui(ej1 , ej2 , . . . , ejm) are chosen independently at random, and so,
for fixed i and k, we have nm−1 random variables in [0, 1] that define Yi,k
and (n − 1)nm−1 random variables in [0, 1] that define Zi,k, and all these
random variables are independent. The random variables defining Yi,k will
correspond to Yjs and random variables defining Zi,k will correspond to Zjs
in Lemma 2.24, and so, we will have Y¯ = 1
nm−1 ·Yi,k and Z¯ = 1(n−1)nm−1 ·Zi,k.
Further, let us notice that
E[Y¯ ] = E
[ 1
n(m−1)
Yi,k
]
=
n(m−1)µ1
n(m−1)
= µ1,
E[Z¯] = E
[ 1
(n− 1)n(m−1)Zi,k
]
=
(n− 1)n(m−1)µ1
(n− 1)n(m−1) = µ1.
Therefore, since (Y¯ − Z¯)− (E[Y¯ ]−E[Z¯]) = Y¯ − Z¯, identity (2.28) gives
us the following:
Pr
[
ui(ek,x−i)− ui(x,x−i) ≥ ε
]
= Pr
[ 1
nm−1
Yi,k − 1
(n− 1)nm−1Zi,k ≥
n
n− 1ε
]
= Pr
[
(Y¯ − Z¯)− (E[Y¯ ]−E[Z¯]) ≥ n
n− 1ε
]
.
Now Hoeffding’s inequality (Lemma 2.24) gives that for any fixed player
i and any fixed strategy k,
Pr
[
ui(ek,x−i)− ui(x,x−i) ≥ ε
]
≤ e−2n
mε2
n−1 ≤ e−2nm−1ε2 .
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Therefore, by the union bound,
Pr
[
∃i∃kui(ek,x−i)− ui(x,x−i) ≥ ε
]
≤ nm e−2nm−1ε2 .
Thus for any 0 < δ < 1, if we set ε =
√
ln(nm/δ)
2nm−1 , then
Pr
[
x is an additive ε-Nash equilibrium
]
≥ 1− δ.
Hence, if we choose δ = 1nm , then with high probability, the strategy profile
x is an additive ε-Nash equilibrium for ε ≥
√
ln(nm)
nm−1 . uunionsq
2.8.2 Additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibria in random
multi-player games
The analysis from Theorem 2.25 can be easily extended to approximate
well-supported Nash equilibria in random multi-player games.
Theorem 2.26 Consider an n-strategies m-player random normal-form game
and let ε > 0. Then with high probability, the strategy profile x = (x, . . . , x)
is an additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium, where x is a fully uniform
distribution.
As in Theorem 2.25, ε does not need to be constant and it may be as
small as ε =
√
3 ln(nm)
nm−1 .
Proof. The proof mimics the analysis from Theorem 2.25, but this time
we focus on well-supported Nash equilibria.
We use the notation from the proof of Theorem 2.25. With this, for a
fixed player i and fixed strategies `, k, we have,
ui(e`,x−i)− ui(ek,x−i) = 1
nm−1
Yi,` − 1
nm−1
Yi,k.
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We will want to use Hoeffding’s inequality with Y¯ = 1
nm−1Yi,` and Z¯ =
1
nm−1Yi,k, and after observing that E[Y¯ ] = E[Z¯] = µi, and
Pr
[
ui(e`,x−i)− ui(ek,x−i) ≥ ε
]
= Pr
[
(Y¯ − Z¯)− (E[Y¯ ]−E[Z¯]) ≥ ε
]
,
we can apply Hoeffding’s inequality (Lemma 2.24) to obtain
Pr
[
ui(e`,x−i)− ui(ek,x−i) ≥ ε
]
≤ e−ε2nm−1 .
Therefore, by the union bound we obtain the following:
Pr
[
∃i∃`∃kui(e`,x−i)− ui(ek,x−i) ≥ ε
]
≤ mn2 · e−ε2nm−1 .
So, for any 0 < δ < 1, if we set ε =
√
ln(n2m/δ)
nm−1 , then
Pr
[
x is an additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium
]
≥ 1− δ.
Therefore, if we choose δ = 1nm , then with high probability, the strategy
profile x is an additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium for ε ≥
√
3 ln(nm)
nm−1 .
uunionsq
Chapter 3
Relative ε-Nash equilibria
While the additive approximation of Nash equilibria has been studied much
in the past, significant less attention has been paid in the relative approxi-
mate Nash equilibria. A relative ε-Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in
which the expected payoff of any player is at least (1 − ε) times the best-
response expected payoff. In this chapter, we will present a polynomial-time
algorithm for computing relative 1/2-Nash equilibria in bimatrix games and
we will generalize it in the case of multi-player games. Results of this chapter
also appeared in [14].
3.1 Finding relative 12-Nash equilibria in bimatrix
games
We will give a simple algorithm to find a relative 12 -Nash equilibrium in
bimatrix games. We consider the strategy profile similar to that already
studied by Feder et al. [28]. Let Rij be the maximum entry in array R. Let
Cic be the maximum entry in row i in array C; in other words, strategy c is
the best-response strategy of the column player to the strategy i of the row
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player.
Claim 3.1 The strategy profile (i, 12j+
1
2c) is a relative
1
2 -Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let (x, y) be the strategy profile (i, 12j +
1
2c). We will show that
xTRy ≥ 12(x′)TRy for every mixed strategy x′ and xTCy ≥ 12xTCy′ for
every mixed strategy y′.
Let us first consider the row player; her expected payoff is equal to
xTRy = 12Rij +
1
2Ric ≥ 12Rij . Since the maximum possible payoff for the
row player is Rij , we have that for every mixed strategy x
′ of the row player,
1
2(x
′)TRy ≤ 12Rij ≤ 12Rij + 12Ric = xTRy.
Next we consider the column player; her expected payoff is xTCy =
1
2Cij +
1
2Cic. Since c is the best-response strategy of the column player
to the strategy i of the row player, we have xTCec ≥ xTCe` for every
` = 1, . . . , n, and hence xTCec ≥ xTCy′ for every mixed strategy y′ of the
column player. Therefore, for every mixed strategy y′ of the column player
we have xTCy = 12Cij +
1
2Cic =
1
2x
TCec ≥ 12xTCy′. uunionsq
3.2 Finding relative
(
1− 11+(m−1)m
)
-Nash equilibria
for m-player games
We generalize the simple algorithm for relative ε-Nash equilibria of two
players (Section 3.1) to multiple players. We consider an m-player normal-
form game with n-strategies for any player and with a constant number of
players m. The size of the description of the game is mnm = O(nm).
Theorem 3.2 For any m-player normal-form game, where m is a constant,
with entries in [0, 1], we can construct in polynomial-time a relative (1 −
1
1+(m−1)m )-Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. For the first m− 1 players, we find their maximum entries in their
payoff matrix in time O(nm), which is in polynomial-time assuming that m
is constant. The maximum entry of any of the first m− 1 players i is a pure
strategy profile s〈i〉 = (s〈i〉1 , s
〈i〉
2 , . . . , s
〈i〉
m ) ∈ S1 × S2 × · · · × Sm, where Si is
the set of strategies of player i. For any player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let Ki ⊆ Si be
the set of her pure strategies in the pure strategy profiles that maximize the
entries of the first m− 1 players, that is, Ki = {s〈j〉i : 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1}. Now,
we can define our relative (1− 11+(m−1)m )-Nash equilibrium. Any of the first
m−1 players plays with uniform probability 1|Ki| any strategy in her set Ki.
Then, player m best-response to this strategy profile is some strategy b. Let
p = 1
(m−1)+(m−1)−(m−1) ; player m plays with probability p any strategy that
is in the set Km and plays the strategy b with probability 1− |Km|p.
For any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, the probability that s〈i〉 is chosen is at
least p ·∏m−1i=1 1|Ki| , and therefore the expected payoff of player i is at least
p ·∏m−1i=1 1|Ki| ≥ p · (m − 1)−(m−1) times her maximum entry. Further, the
expected payoff of player m is at least 1 − |Km|p ≥ 1 − (m − 1)p of her
best-response payoff. Therefore, the obtained strategy profile is a relative
ε-Nash equilibrium for ε = 1−min{p · (m− 1)−(m−1), 1− (m− 1)p}. If we
plug in the value of p, we obtain p · (m− 1)−(m−1) = 1− (m− 1)p, and that
(m−1)p = m− 1
m− 1 + (m− 1)−(m−1) =
(m− 1)m
(m− 1)m + 1 = 1−
1
(m− 1)m + 1 .
Therefore,
ε = 1−min{p·(m−1)−(m−1), 1−(m−1)p} = (m−1)p = 1− 1
(m− 1)m + 1 .
uunionsq
68 CHAPTER 3. RELATIVE ε-NASH EQUILIBRIA
3.3 Finding relative
(
1− 11+(m−1)m−1
)
-Nash equilib-
ria for symmetric m-player games
We adjust the general algorithm of section 3.2 to the case of symmetric
m-player games.
Theorem 3.3 For any symmetric m-player normal-form game, where m
is a constant, with entries in [0, 1], we can construct in polynomial-time a
relative (1− 1
1+(m−1)m−1 )-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. For the player 1 we find the maximum entry of her payoff matrix. In
this strategy profile player m plays a pure strategy l. We keep the strategy of
the player m fixed. The subgame that is created for the other m− 1 players
in the set {1, . . . ,m − 1} is a symmetric game because of the definition of
the symmetric games. So, the m − 1 players have their maximum entry in
the same subgame. For any player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, let Ki ⊆ Si be the set
of her pure strategies in the pure strategy profiles that maximize the entries
of the first m− 1 players, that is, Ki = {s〈j〉i : 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1}.
Now, we can define our relative (1− 1
1+(m−1)m−1 )-Nash equilibrium. Any
of the first m − 1 players plays with uniform probability 1|Ki| any strategy
in her set Ki. Then, player m best-response to this strategy profile is some
strategy b. Let player m plays with probability p the initial fixed strategy l
and plays the strategy b with probability 1− p.
For any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, the probability that s〈i〉 is chosen is at
least p ·∏m−1i=1 1|Ki| , and therefore the expected payoff of player i is at least
p ·∏m−1i=1 1|Ki| ≥ p · (m − 1)−(m−1) times her maximum entry. Further, the
expected payoff of player m is at least 1 − p of her best-response payoff.
Therefore, the obtained strategy profile is a relative ε-Nash equilibrium for
ε = 1−min{p · (m−1)−(m−1), 1−p}. If we plug in the value of p, we obtain
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p · (m− 1)−(m−1) = 1− p, and that
p =
1
1 + (m− 1)−(m−1) =
(m− 1)m−1
(m− 1)m−1 + 1 = 1−
1
(m− 1)m−1 + 1 .
Therefore,
ε = 1−min{p · (m− 1)−(m−1), 1− p} = p = 1− 1
(m− 1)m−1 + 1 .
uunionsq
Part II
Optimal approximate Nash
equilibria
70

Chapter 4
Near optimal additive ε-Nash
equilibria
While the Nash theorem [45] ensures that every finite two-player game has
at least one Nash equilibrium, typical games posses many equilibria and it
is natural to seek those equilibria that are more desirable than others. One
natural measure of the most desirable equilibria is to maximize its social
welfare, that is, the sum of players’ payoffs. Unlike the problem of finding
a Nash equilibrium, which is known to be PPAD-complete, finding a Nash
equilibrium with maximal social welfare is known to be NP-hard [30, 12, 43],
and thus, it is likely to be computationally even more difficult. In fact, it
is even NP-hard to approximate (to any positive ratio) the maximum social
welfare obtained in an exact Nash equilibrium, even in symmetric 2-player
games [12, Corollary 6]. Therefore, it is natural to ask the question of
computational complexity of finding an additive ε-Nash equilibrium that
approximates well the optimal social welfare. The quasi-polynomial-time
algorithm by [42] not only finds an additive ε-Nash equilibrium, but also
the social welfare of the equilibrium found is an ε-approximation of the
72
73
social welfare in any Nash equilibrium. In other words, in quasi-polynomial-
time we can find an arbitrarily good additive ε-Nash equilibrium with social
welfare near to the best Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games.
4.1 Additive ε-Nash equilibria with near optimal
social welfare
In this chapter, we focus on the analysis of the social welfare in additive
ε-Nash equilibria in a two-player game for a fixed ε, for the regime when
we know that we can find an additive ε-Nash equilibrium. Our goal is more
general than that presented in earlier works, like e.g., in [4, 8, 34, 44]; it is
not to compare the social welfare of an additive ε-Nash equilibrium to that
of any Nash equilibrium, but rather to compare it with the optimal social
welfare. Results of this chapter also appeared in [17].
It is known that a Nash equilibrium can be arbitrarily far from the
optimal social welfare in a bimatrix game. A simple example describing this
situation is a prisoners’ dilemma game:
C D
C
(
2
3 ,
2
3
)
(0, 1)
D (1, 0) (δ, δ)
Assuming that δ ∈ (0, 23), the optimal social welfare is achieved by the
strategy profile (C,C) with total payoff of 43 , but the unique Nash equilib-
rium is the strategy profile (D,D) with total payoff of 2δ. Thus, by taking
δ arbitrarily small, we can make the social welfare of a Nash equilibrium
arbitrarily far from the optimal social welfare of a game.
The central question studied in this chapter is if we allow the players up
to ε loss to deviate from the best-response strategy, whether we can find a
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stable strategy profile (an additive ε-Nash equilibrium) that guarantees the
players a value close to the social optimum?
We note that, to the best of our knowledge, the known polynomial-
time algorithms to construct an additive ε-Nash equilibrium for a constant
ε > 0, do not guarantee any welfare for the additive ε-Nash equilibrium and
they return an additive ε-Nash equilibrium strategy profile which can be
arbitrarily far from the optimal social welfare (see, e.g., [7, 20, 22, 23, 37, 51]
for more details).
4.2 New contributions
In this chapter, we provide several results showing that for every bimatrix
game, for every ε > 0, there is always an additive ε-Nash equilibrium with
near optimal social welfare, at least a constant fraction the optimal social
welfare. Our analysis shows that by considering an appropriate mixture of
the optimal strategies and exact or additive ε-Nash equilibria, one can find
the desired additive ε-Nash equilibrium with near optimal social welfare.
We begin with the case when ε ≥ 12 , the case for which it is known that
there is always an additive ε-Nash equilibrium with constant size support (cf.
[23]). We show that in that case we can find an additive ε-Nash equilibrium
with constant size support whose social welfare is at least 2
√
ε− ε ≥ 0.914
times the optimal social welfare. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our
bound for the social welfare is tight.
Theorem 4.1 For every ε ≥ 12 , we can construct in polynomial-time an
additive ε-Nash equilibrium (and with constant size support) whose social
value is at least 2
√
ε− ε times the optimal social welfare. Furthermore,
there is a bimatrix game for which for every ε ≥ 12 , every additive ε-Nash
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equilibrium has social welfare no more than 2
√
ε− ε times the optimal social
welfare.
In particular, we can construct in polynomial-time an additive 12 -Nash
equilibrium whose social welfare is at least 2
√
2−1
2 ≈ 0.914 times the optimal
social welfare.
As a byproduct of our approach, we also obtain a stronger result for the
class of win-lose bimatrix games and show that for any ε ∈ [12 , 1], for any
win-lose bimatrix game with values in {0, 1}, we can find in polynomial-time
an additive ε-Nash equilibrium with optimal social welfare (Theorem 4.5).
The case ε < 12 is more challenging and while we do not have a tight
bound for the social welfare in this case, we can still construct an additive
ε-Nash equilibrium with social welfare that is at least κε times the optimum,
for some positive constant κε. One challenge in the case ε <
1
2 stems from
the fact that there are bimatrix games with no additive/relative ε-Nash
equilibrium with constant support (cf. [28]), which requires us to use a
different approach than that in Theorem 4.1 to deal with this case. Using
as a starting point additive ε∗-Nash equilibria with arbitrary social welfare
and ε∗ < ε, we modify them to obtain an additive ε-Nash equilibrium with
high social welfare to get the following.
Theorem 4.2 For every fixed positive ε < 12 there is a positive constant
κε = (1 −
√
1− ε)2, such that every bimatrix game has an additive ε-Nash
equilibrium with social welfare at least κε times the optimal social welfare.
Our construction is algorithmic and gives the following.
Theorem 4.3 Let ε∗ be such that there is a polynomial-time algorithm for
finding an additive ε∗-Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. Then for every
fixed positive ε > ε∗, there is a positive constant ζε,ε∗ = (1−
√
1−ε
1−ε∗ )
2, such
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that for every bimatrix game one can find in polynomial-time an additive
ε-Nash equilibrium with social welfare at least ζε,ε∗ times the optimal social
welfare.
We also obtain further algorithmic results improving the bounds for the
social welfare above in several special cases for ε < 12 . For example, in
the case when the optimal social welfare is at least 2−3ε1−ε , then in Theorem
4.8 we design a polynomial-time algorithm that finds an additive ε-Nash
equilibrium with constant support size and with social welfare at least (1−
ε(1−ε)
2−3ε ) ≥ 0.5 times the optimum social welfare. For this case we will prove
that if the optimum social welfare is less than 2−3ε1−ε , we need logarithmic
support in order to create an additive ε-Nash equilibrium.
We will prove Theorem 4.1 in Section 4.4 and Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 in
Section 4.8.
4.3 Preliminaries
The social welfare is the total payoff of both players, i.e., it is sw = xTRy+
xTCy = xT (R + C)y. Throughout the chapter, we let (i, j) to denote the
pure strategy profile that maximizes the sum of the payoffs of the two players
(utilitarian objective). We define opt to be the optimal social welfare, that
is,
∀x, y ∈ [0, 1]n, opt = Rij + Cij ≥ xT (R+ C)y. (4.1)
(Note that i and j can be trivially found in O(n2) time.)
We define the pure strategy r of the row player as the best-response
strategy of the row player to the strategy j of the column player and the
pure strategy c of the column player as the best-response strategy of the
column player to the strategy i of the row player. The optimality of the
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profile (i, j) yields:
opt = Rij + Cij ≥ Ric + Cic, (4.2)
opt = Rij + Cij ≥ Rrj + Crj . (4.3)
The central goal of this chapter is for a fixed ε ∈ [0, 1], to find an additive
ε-Nash equilibrium strategy profile (x∗, y∗) whose social welfare sw is as close
to opt as possible.
In our analysis, we will consider several cases depending on the values
of Rrj −Rij and Cic − Cij :
• Rrj −Rij ≤ ε and Cic − Cij ≤ ε,
• Rrj−Rij ≥ ε and Cic−Cij > ε (and the symmetric case Rrj−Rij > ε
and Cic − Cij ≥ ε),
• Rrj−Rij < ε and Cic−Cij > ε (and the symmetric case Rrj−Rij > ε
and Cic − Cij < ε).
We will use the fact that in the first case, when Rrj − Rij ≤ ε and
Cic −Cij ≤ ε, the strategy profile (i, j) (which can be found in polynomial-
time) is an additive ε-Nash equilibrium, and since it has the optimal social
welfare, in this case we can find an optimal solution by choosing strategy
(i, j). Thus, our main task will be to find a good algorithm to construct an
additive ε-Nash equilibrium in the other cases.
In our analysis, we will separately consider two regimes: one when ε ≥ 12
and one when ε < 12 .
4.4 Approximation with ε ≥ 12
We begin with the scenario when ε ≥ 12 , proving Theorem 4.1. We will
show in Section 4.5 that if ε ≥ 12 , then one can find an additive ε-Nash
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equilibrium with constant size support that has an almost optimal social
welfare, at least 2
√
ε− ε ≥ 0.914 times the optimal social welfare. We will
also prove that our bound is tight for any ε ≥ 12 , by showing in Section
4.6 explicit bimatrix games for which every additive ε-Nash equilibrium has
social welfare no more than 2
√
ε− ε times the optimal social welfare.
Let us recall that (i, j) is the pure strategy profile that maximizes the
sum of the payoffs of the two players, and hence opt = Rij +Cij (cf. (4.1)).
Let us recall that r is the pure strategy of the row player that is the best-
response strategy of the row player to the strategy j of the column player
and that c is the pure strategy of the column player that is the best-response
strategy of the column player to the strategy i of the row player. We will
now consider several cases depending on the values of Rrj−Rij and Cic−Cij .
Let us first note that it is impossible to have Rrj − Rij ≥ ε and Cic −
Cij > ε, or to have Rrj − Rij > ε and Cic − Cij ≥ ε (since these cases are
symmetric, we will focus only on the first one). To show that we cannot
have Rrj−Rij ≥ ε and Cic−Cij > ε, we first observe that these inequalities
yield:
Rij ≤ Rrj − ε ≤ 1− ε and Cij < Cic − ε < 1− ε. (4.4)
Next, Rrj − Rij ≥ ε together with (4.3) yield Rij + Cij ≥ Rrj + Crj ≥
Rij + ε+Crj , which implies Cij ≥ ε. Similarly, Cic −Cij > ε and (4.2) give
Rij + Cij ≥ Ric + Cic > Ric + Cij + ε, and hence Rij > ε. Now, however,
we observe that with the assumption ε ≥ 12 , the inequalities above form a
contradiction, and therefore this case cannot happen.
Since we cannot have either of the casesRrj−Rij ≥ ε and Cic−Cij > ε, or
Rrj−Rij > ε and Cic−Cij ≥ ε, we only have to consider one of the following
three scenarios: (1) Rrj −Rij ≤ ε and Cic −Cij ≤ ε, (2) Rrj −Rij < ε and
Cic − Cij > ε, (3) Rrj −Rij > ε and Cic − Cij < ε.
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We will now consider these cases, depending on the values of Rrj − Rij
and Cic − Cij :
(1) If Rrj − Rij ≤ ε and Cic − Cij ≤ ε, then we know that the strategy
profile (i, j) is an additive ε-Nash equilibrium with the optimal social
welfare.
(2) If Rrj −Rij < ε and Cic − Cij > ε, then we note that
Cic > Cij + ε ≥ max{Cij , ε}, (4.5)
and that (4.2) yields
Rij −Ric ≥ Cic − Cij > ε. (4.6)
Next, we prove a key lemma describing an additive ε-Nash equilibrium
in our setting.
Lemma 4.4 Let ε ∈ [12 , 1], Rrj − Rij < ε, and Cic − Cij > ε. Let p =
ε
Cic−Cij . The strategy profile (i, pj + (1− p)c), where p is the probability
for the column player to play strategy j and (1− p) is the probability of
playing strategy c respectively, is an additive ε-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let us first notice that p is well defined with 0 < p ≤ 1 since
0 < ε < Cic − Cij .
Let b be the best-response strategy of the row player to the strategy
pj + (1 − p)c of the column player. If the row player plays strategy i,
her incentive to deviate is:
pRbj+(1−p)Rbc−pRij−(1−p)Ric ≤ pRrj+(1−p)−pRij−(1−p)Ric
≤ p + (1− p)− p(Rij −Ric) = 1− ε · (Rij −Ric)
Cic − Cij ≤ 1− ε ≤ ε.
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The first inequality follows from Rbj ≤ Rrj and Rbc ≤ 1, the second one
because of the fact that Rrj ≤ 1 and Ric ≥ 0, the third one because
Rij +Cij ≥ Ric+Cic, and the final one follows from the fact that ε ≥ 12 .
On the other hand, the incentive to deviate for the column player when
the row player plays i is Cic− pCij − (1− p)Cic = ε. Hence the strategy
profile (i, pj + (1− p)c) is an additive ε-Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
(3) Rrj −Rij > ε and Cic − Cij < ε is symmetric to case (2).
4.5 Upper bound in Theorem 4.1
We now prove that ε-Nash (R,C, ε) presented below, returns an additive ε-
Nash equilibrium with social welfare at least (2
√
ε−ε)·opt. By the arguments
above, we only have to consider the following scenarios: (1) Rrj − Rij ≤ ε
and Cic − Cij ≤ ε, (2) Rrj − Rij < ε and Cic − Cij > ε, (3) Rrj − Rij > ε
and Cic − Cij < ε.
ε-Nash (R,C, ε)
• Find i, j such that Rij + Cij is maximized.
• Find r, c such that Rrj is maximized and Cic is maximized.
• If Rrj −Rij ≤ ε and Cic − Cij ≤ ε, then return strategy profile (i, j).
• If Rrj − Rij < ε and Cic − Cij > ε, then set p = εCic−Cij and return
strategy profile (i, pj + (1− p)c).
• If Rrj − Rij > ε and Cic − Cij < ε, then set p = εRrj−Rij and return
strategy profile (pi+ (1− p)r, j).
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Let us recall that if Rrj − Rij ≤ ε and Cic − Cij ≤ ε, then the strategy
(i, j) is an additive ε-Nash equilibrium with social welfare opt, and therefore
the algorithm will return an optimum solution that is an additive ε-Nash
equilibrium. Therefore, we only have to consider scenarios (2) and (3). Since
these scenarios are symmetric, we focus only on scenario (2), when Rrj −
Rij < ε and Cic−Cij > ε: we prove that the strategy profile (i, pj+(1−p)c)
with p = εCic−Cij has social welfare at least (2
√
ε− ε) · opt.
The social welfare of our solution is sw = p(Rij+Cij)+(1−p)(Ric+Cic).
Let
ρ =
opt
sw
=
Rij + Cij
p(Rij + Cij) + (1− p)(Ric + Cic)
≤ Rij + Cij
p(Rij + Cij) + (1− p)Cic . (4.7)
Observe that if we consider the last bound as a function of Rij , we
obtain a function of the form f(x) = x+βpx+γ , with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, β = Cij
and γ = pCij + (1 − p)Cic. Notice further that since by (4.5), we have
pCij + (1 − p)Cic > pCij + (1 − p)Cij = Cij ≥ 0, we obtain γ > β ≥ 0.
Therefore, by considering the derivative f ′(x) = γ−pβ
(px+γ)2
> 0, we observe
that f is increasing in x. Thus, the right hand side of (4.7) takes the
maximum value when Rij is maximum, that is, is equal to 1, independently
from the other variables. Hence,
ρ ≤ 1 + Cij
p + pCij + (1− p)Cic
=
−C2ij − Cij(1− Cic) + Cic
−Cij(Cic − ε) + Cic(Cic − ε) + ε. (4.8)
We note that the right hand side of (4.8) takes maximum when Cic =
Cij +
√
ε, and hence when p =
√
ε. If we plug this in (4.8), then we obtain
ρ ≤ 1+Cij
2
√
ε−ε+Cij . Next, we observe that since ε ∈ [
1
2 , 1] we have 2
√
ε− ε ≤ 1,
and hence the right hand side of is decreasing and takes the maximum at
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Figure 4.1: Bound for ρ = optsw as a function of ε, ε ≥ 12 . Notice that ρ(1) = 1
and ρ(12) ≤ 22√2−1 ≈ 1.094.
Cij = 0. Therefore ρ ≤ 12√ε−ε . This completes the proof of the first part
(upper bound) of Theorem 4.1.
Figure 4.1 depicts the upper bound as a function of ε.
4.6 Lower bound in Theorem 4.1
We now show the second part of Theorem 4.1 and for every ε ∈ [12 , 1],
we present a game for which the social welfare of every additive ε-Nash
equilibrium is at most (2
√
ε− ε) · opt.
Fix ε, 12 ≤ ε ≤ 1. Consider a bimatrix game with one strategy for
the row player, strategy i, and with two strategies for the column player,
strategies j and c. Set Rij = 1, Cij = 0, Ric = 0, and Cic =
√
ε, resulting in
the following game:
j c
i (1, 0) (0,
√
ε)
The optimal strategy is (i, j) with the social welfare opt = 1. In order to
obtain an optimal additive ε-Nash equilibrium the column player needs to
randomize between her strategies, playing strategy j with probability p and
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strategy c with probability (1−p). Then, the strategy profile (i, pj+(1−p)c)
is an additive ε-Nash equilibrium if and only if
√
ε ≤ (1− p)√ε+ ε. This is
equivalent to p ≤ √ε. Conditioned on this, we bound the social welfare of
any additive ε-Nash equilibrium for this game. For any 0 ≤ p ≤ √ε, if we
denote the social welfare of an additive ε-Nash equilibrium with fixed p by
swp, then we obtain, swp = p + (1 − p)
√
ε ≤ √ε +√ε(1 − √ε) = 2√ε − ε.
Therefore, since opt = 1, we conclude that for the game defined above, the
social welfare of every additive ε-Nash equilibrium is at most 2
√
ε− ε times
the optimal social welfare. This completes the proof of the second part
(lower bound) of Theorem 4.1.
4.7 Win-lose games with ε ≥ 12
We note that for the class of win-lose games, one can easily show the fol-
lowing stronger bound.
Theorem 4.5 For any win-lose bimatrix game with values in {0,1} and any
ε ∈ [12 , 1], we can find in polynomial-time an additive ε-Nash equilibrium with
optimal social welfare.
Proof. Consider a win-lose bimatrix game in which every entry of the
pair of the payoffs of the players belongs to the set {{0, 0}, {1, 0}, {0, 1}}.
We exclude the trivial pure Nash equilibrium {1, 1}, it is easy to see that
this equilibrium is also an optimum strategy profile. If (i, j) is an optimal
strategy profile, then we know that except from the trivial case Rrj−Rij ≤ ε
and Cic−Cij ≤ ε that ρ = 1, for the case of Rrj−Rij < ε and Cic−Cij > ε,
(4.5) implies Cic = 1 so Ric = 0, (4.6) implies Rij = 1 so Cij = 0. By
Lemma 4.4, for any ε ∈ [12 , 1] there is an additive ε-Nash equilibrium for
p = ε, so in this case the strategy profile (i, pj + (1 − p)c) is an additive
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ε-Nash equilibrium with
ρ =
opt
sw
=
Rij + Cij
p(Rij + Cij) + (1− p)(Ric + Cic)
=
1
p + (1− p) = 1.
uunionsq
4.8 Approximation with ε < 12
The analysis of the case ε < 12 is more complicated and our results are not
as tight as those for the case ε ≥ 12 . One important reason why this case is
more challenging is that for ε < 12 , we know that we have to consider large
support size of the strategies. This follows from [28], who showed that for
ε < 12 , to find an additive ε-Nash equilibrium the support needs to be of size
logarithmic in the number of strategies available to the players.
We begin with a general transformation that takes an arbitrary additive
ε∗-Nash equilibria with arbitrary social welfare and outputs an additive ε-
Nash equilibrium, ε∗ < ε, with social welfare at least a constant fraction
the optimal social welfare. This is achieved by considering an appropriate
mixture of a strategy profile with the optimal social welfare and an addi-
tive ε∗-Nash equilibrium. We also show that our transformation runs in
polynomial-time, and thus if there is a polynomial-time algorithm finding
an additive ε∗-Nash equilibrium then our scheme can find in polynomial-
time an additive ε-Nash equilibrium, ε∗ < ε, with social welfare at least
a constant fraction the optimal social welfare. Next, we will analyze the
special case where the social welfare is greater or equal to 2−3ε1−ε , when we
find additive ε-Nash equilibria with high social welfare.
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Figure 4.2: Bound for (1 −√1− ε)2 as a function of ε, as in Theorem 4.2;
(1−√1− ε)2 ≈ 0.0858 for ε = 12 .
4.9 Reducing social welfare
As mentioned earlier, if ε < 12 then we cannot hope to find an additive ε-
Nash equilibrium with constant size support, which is the approach we used
in Section 4.4. However, we will show that using an existing additive ε∗-
Nash equilibrium, ε∗ < ε, with an arbitrary social welfare, we can construct
an additive ε-Nash equilibrium with social welfare that is at least a constant
times optimal, to conclude Theorem 4.2. We begin with the following key
lemma.
Lemma 4.6 Let 0 ≤ ε∗ < 1, and ε∗ < ε < 1. Let (x∗, y∗) be the strategy
profile of an additive ε∗-Nash equilibrium. Then, for p = 1−√(1− ε)/(1− ε∗),
the strategy profile (pi+ (1−p)x∗, pj+ (1−p)y∗) is an additive ε-Nash equi-
librium with the social welfare sw ≥ p2 · opt.
Proof. Since (x∗, y∗) is a strategy profile of an additive ε∗-Nash equilibrium,
the maximum incentive to deviate for any player in the strategy profile
(x∗, y∗) is ε∗. Therefore, since under strategies (i, j), (i, y∗), (x∗, j) no player
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can improve its payoff by more than 1, we obtain that if the players play the
strategy profile (pi+ (1− p)x∗, pj+ (1− p)y∗), then the maximum incentive
to deviate for any player is upper bounded by the following:
(1− p)2ε∗ + p2 + p(1− p) + p(1− p) = 1− (1− p)2(1− ε∗).
Hence, to ensure that this strategy is an additive ε-Nash equilibrium for
0 ≤ ε∗ < ε < 1, we set p = 1 −√(1− ε)/(1− ε∗). It is easy to check that
0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Next, we can bound the social welfare sw = p2(Rij+Cij)+(1−p)2x∗T (R+
C)y∗ ≥ p2(Rij + Cij) = p2 · opt. uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 4.2: We choose ε∗ = 0 in Lemma 4.6 (here we use
Nash theorem [45] to guarantee the existence of an exact Nash equilibrium
(x∗, y∗)) to ensure that one can use the strategy profile (pi+ (1− p)x∗, pj +
(1 − p)y∗) with p = 1 − √1− ε to obtain an additive ε-Nash equilibrium
with sw ≥ p2 · opt = (1−√1− ε)2 · opt. uunionsq
Our construction above can be trivially transformed into a polynomial-
time algorithm, assuming that we have at hand a polynomial-time algorithm
for finding an additive ε∗-Nash equilibrium in any bimatrix game. This
proves Theorem 4.3 with ζε,ε∗ = (1 −
√
1−ε
1−ε∗ )
2. Since the best currently
known value for ε∗ is 0.3393 [51], this approach works (currently) only for
ε > 0.3393.
4.10 Analysis of the case opt ≥ 2−3ε1−ε
We consider a special case, when opt ≥ 2−3ε1−ε , for which we can construct
additive ε-Nash equilibria with high social welfare. We will show in Theorem
4.8 that there is a good additive ε-Nash equilibrium that has a constant size
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support and high social welfare. This result is complemented by Theorem
4.9 that shows that if opt < 2−3ε1−ε , then an additive ε-Nash equilibrium may
require a logarithmic size support.
We begin with the case Rrj − Rij < ε and Cic − Cij > ε (the case
Rrj −Rij > ε and Cic − Cij < ε is symmetric).
Lemma 4.7 Let ε ∈ [0, 12), Rrj − Rij < ε, Cic − Cij > ε, and p =
1−ε
−1+2ε+2Rij(1−ε) . If opt ≥ 2−3ε1−ε then the strategy profile (i, pj+(1−p)c) is an
additive ε-Nash equilibrium with social welfare greater than 2−4ε+ε
2
2−3ε · opt =
(1− ε(1−ε)2−3ε ) · opt.
Proof. We first show that p is well defined with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Since Cic−Cij >
ε, we get Cij < 1 − ε. Thus, if opt ≥ 2−3ε1−ε , then opt = Rij + Cij yields
Rij ∈ (1−ε−ε21−ε , 1] and Cij ∈ [1−2ε1−ε , 1 − ε). Hence, −1 + 2ε + 2Rij(1 − ε) >
−1 + 2ε+ 2(1− ε− ε2) ≥ 1− ε, and thus p is well defined.
Next, we prove that the strategy profile (i, pj + (1− p)c) is an additive
ε-Nash equilibrium. Let b be the best-response strategy of the row player
to the strategy (pj + (1− p)c) of the column player. Then the incentive of
the row player to deviate from strategy i is:
pRbj + (1− p)Rbc − pRij − (1− p)Ric ≤ 1− pRij ,
and the incentive of the column player to deviate is:
Cic − pCij − (1− p)Cic = p(Cic − Cij)
≤ p
(
1−
(
2− 3ε
1− ε −Rij
))
= p
(
Rij − 1− 2ε
1− ε
)
.
Here we use the facts that c is the best-response strategy of the column
player to the strategy i of the row player, and that Cic ≤ 1 and Cij =
opt−Rij ≥ 2−3ε1−ε −Rij .
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Our choice of p ensures that p
(
Rij − 1−2ε1−ε
)
= 1−pRij = −1+2ε+Rij(1−ε)−1+2ε+2Rij(1−ε) ,
which takes the maximum at Rij = 1. Therefore 1− pRij ≤ −1+2ε+(1−ε)−1+2ε+2(1−ε) =
ε, what implies that the strategy profile (i, pj+(1−p)c) is an additive ε-Nash
equilibrium. This yields the following lower bound for the social welfare sw
of the strategy profile (i, pj + (1− p)c):
opt
sw
≤ 1 +
1−2ε
1−ε
pRij +
1−2ε
1−ε
=
1 + 1−2ε1−ε
Rij(1−ε)
−1+2ε+2Rij(1−ε) +
1−2ε
1−ε
≤ 1 +
1−2ε
1−ε
1− ε+ 1−2ε1−ε
=
2− 3ε
2− 4ε+ ε2 .
uunionsq
With Lemma 4.7 at hand, we can prove the following.
Theorem 4.8 Let ε ∈ [0, 12) and opt ≥ 2−3ε1−ε . Then one can find in polynomial-
time an additive ε-Nash equilibrium with constant support size and with so-
cial welfare at least (1− ε(1−ε)2−3ε ) · opt ≥ 0.5 · opt.
Proof. We consider three cases:
• If Rrj − Rij ≤ ε and Cic − Cij ≤ ε, then the strategy profile (i, j) is
an additive ε-Nash equilibrium with sw = opt.
• If Rrj−Rij ≥ ε and Cic−Cij > ε (the Rrj−Rij > ε and Cic−Cij ≥ ε
is symmetric), then opt = Rij +Cij < (Rrj − ε) + (Cic− ε) ≤ 2(1− ε).
But is impossible if at the same time ε < 12 and opt ≥ 2−3ε1−ε , and
therefore this case cannot happen.
• Finally, if Rrj − Rij < ε and Cic − Cij > ε (the case Rrj − Rij > ε
and Cic − Cij < ε is symmetric), then by Lemma 4.7, the strategy
profile (i, pj + (1 − p)c) with p = 1−ε−1+2ε+2Rij(1−ε) , is an additive ε-
Nash equilibrium with social welfare sw ≥ (1− ε(1−ε)2−3ε ) · opt.
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The bound (1− ε(1−ε)2−3ε ) ·opt ≥ 12 ·opt follows from the fact that in the interval
ε ∈ [0, 12 ], function 1− ε(1−ε)2−3ε is non-increasing in ε, and hence it is minimized
at ε = 12 with the value
1
2 .
All required strategies can be found in polynomial-time. uunionsq
Theorem 4.8 ensures that if opt ≥ 2−3ε1−ε and ε < 12 , then we can create
an additive ε-Nash equilibrium with social welfare greater than or equal to
1
2opt, which is a superior upper bound to the general case from Theorem
4.2.
Lower bound. We can prove also a lower bound that for any ε ≤ 12 , if
opt = 2−3ε1−ε then for any εˆ < ε, we may need support of size Ω(log n) to
construct an additive εˆ-Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4.9 Let ε ≤ 12 . There exists a bimatrix game (R,C) in [0, 1]n×n
for which the maximum sum of the payoffs of the players is opt = 2−3ε1−ε , and
for any εˆ < ε, any additive εˆ-Nash equilibrium requires logarithmic support.
Proof. Let k = log n−2 log log n. Let (R,C) be the two payoff matrices in
[0, 1]n×n in which every entry is chosen independently at random from the
set {(1, 1−2ε1−ε ), (0, 1)}. We consider the row player; the case of the column
player is analogous. We will show that with high probability, for any k
columns in the payoff matrix of the column player, there is at least one row
that has all 1s in these k columns.
Fix any set of k columns. The probability that a single row has at least
one 0 in these k columns is 1 − 2−k. Thus, the probability that every row
has at least one 0 in these k columns is (1 − 2−k)n. Hence, the probability
that there is a set of k columns for which all rows have at least one 0 in
these k columns is at most
(
n
k
)
(1 − 2−k)n. Since our choice of k yields
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n
k
)
(1 − 2−k)n  1, we conclude that with high probability, for every set
of k columns there is at least one row that has all 1s in these k columns.
Analogous arguments hold for the column player. Let us condition on the
two events and assume that for every set of k columns in the payoff matrix
of the row player there is a row that has all 1s in these columns, and that
for every set of k rows in the payoff matrix of the column player there is a
column that has all 1s in these rows.
Let us assume that there is an additive εˆ-Nash equilibrium (x∗, y∗) for
some εˆ < ε ≤ 12 , with the support of size k. Let p =
∑
`,m x
∗
`y
∗
m, where the
sum is over all pairs (`,m), 1 ≤ `,m ≤ n, such that (R`m, C`m) = (1, 1−2ε1−ε ).
p is the probability that the players play the strategy profile (1, 1−2ε1−ε ) in the
additive εˆ-Nash equilibrium, and 1−p is the probability that the players play
the strategy profile (0, 1) in the additive εˆ-Nash equilibrium. The expected
payoff of the row player is p, and the expected payoff of the column player
is p
(
1−2ε
1−ε
)
+ (1− p).
Since (x∗, y∗) is an additive εˆ-Nash equilibrium, p + εˆ ≥ 1 for the row
player, and thus p > 1− ε. Hence, the expected payoff of the column player
is p
(
1−2ε
1−ε
)
+ (1 − p) = 1 − pε1−ε < 1 − ε < 1 − εˆ. But this contradicts
the condition for the column player in the assumption that (x∗, y∗) is an
additive εˆ-Nash equilibrium.
uunionsq
Chapter 5
Plutocratic and egalitarian
ε-NE
The fundamental problem in game theory is to study properties of equilib-
ria in non-cooperative games. By the classical result of Nash [45], we know
that every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium. However, in many
natural scenarios one is not only interested in finding or characterizing any
equilibrium, but in fact, one wants to find equilibria that will have some
desirable properties, one wants to find “best” or “fairest” equilibria. While
we understand quite well various properties of the set of all Nash equilibria,
if we consider also the quality of a solution sought and aim at characterizing
the “best” Nash equilibria, then our knowledge is rather limited.
The situation is even more challenging if we take into account the com-
putational complexity of the task. For example, even in two-player games,
the problem of finding an arbitrary Nash equilibrium is known to be PPAD-
complete and the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium with almost any
additional constraint is NP-hard, and thus, it is likely to be computation-
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ally even more difficult (see, e.g., [30, 12, 43]). In fact, it is even NP-hard to
approximate (to any positive ratio) the maximum social welfare, or the max-
imum egalitarian payoffs, or the maximum plutocratic payoffs, obtained in
an exact Nash equilibrium, even in symmetric two-player games [12, Corol-
laries 6–8].
In this chapter we study the fundamental problem of computing additive
ε-Nash equilibria that are close to the “best” Nash equilibrium in bimatrix
games. Our focus is on the analysis of “best” or “approximately best” ad-
ditive ε-Nash equilibria in a two-player game for a fixed ε, for the regime
when we know that we can find an additive ε-Nash equilibrium. The central
question studied in this chapter is if we allow the players up to ε loss to de-
viate from the best-response strategy, whether we can find a stable strategy
profile (an additive ε-Nash equilibrium) that guarantees the players benefits
close to the optimum in any Nash equilibrium? Results of this chapter also
appeared in [18].
There have been some investigations aiming to efficiently find additive
ε-Nash equilibrium that also approximate well the social welfare (the total
payoff of the players), see Chapter 4. However in this chapter, we will con-
sider equilibria focusing on other objectives: instead of aiming to maximize
the social welfare, or, in short, expected payoff of the players, we will study
the scenarios where one wants to maximize the smallest of the payoffs, or
that one wants to maximize the largest of the payoffs. That is, we will
consider two natural settings to describe the notion of the “best Nash equi-
librium”:
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• plutocratic Nash equilibrium—that maximizes the expected maximum
of the payoffs of the players;
• egalitarian Nash equilibrium—that maximizes the expected minimum
of the payoffs of the players.
We provide a description of the quality of additive ε-Nash equilibria
that approximate best plutocratic and egalitarian Nash equilibrium for any
ε ≥ 3−
√
5
2 ≈ 0.382. Furthermore, we match our existential results with
polynomial-time algorithms to find additive ε-Nash equilibria that approxi-
mate the best Nash equilibrium. The results are obtained by first showing
the existence of such additive ε-Nash equilibria adapting the method due to
Daskalakis et al. [23] and by carefully maintaining the tradeoff between the
payoffs of the players. Once the existence of an appropriate additive ε-Nash
equilibria is given, we apply an LP-based approach to find it.
Observe that our analysis assumes that ε ≥ 3−
√
5
2 ≈ 0.382, which covers
almost the entire regime when we know that we can find an additive ε-Nash
equilibrium in polynomial-time. Indeed, the smallest value of ε for which
we know how to find an additive ε-Nash equilibrium in polynomial-time is
ε ≈ 0.3393 [51].
The tradeoff between additive ε-Nash equilibria and the quality of the
solution found has been studied in the past, though in this context, the main
focus of the research was on the goal of finding additive ε-Nash equilibria
that approximate the optimal social welfare (the expected total payoff of
the players). There have been two strands of these investigations, one com-
paring the social welfare to the optimal social welfare of the game and one
comparing it to the optimal social welfare in any Nash equilibrium.
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It is known that a Nash equilibrium can be arbitrarily far from the
optimal social welfare in a bimatrix game, see, e.g., Chapter 4. Motivated
by this result, there has been recent study aiming to find an additive ε-
Nash equilibrium with the social welfare close to the best possible (optimal
social welfare of the game, not necessarily in a Nash equilibrium). It was
shown in Chapter 4 that for every fixed ε > 0, every bimatrix game (with
values in [0, 1]) has an additive ε-Nash equilibrium with the social welfare
at least a constant factor of the optimum. For example, for any ε ≥ 12 , there
is always an additive ε-Nash equilibrium whose social welfare is at least
2
√
ε − ε ≥ 0.914 times the optimal social welfare, and this bound is tight.
Furthermore, these results are algorithmic, and for every fixed 0 ≤ ε∗ < ε, if
one can find an additive ε∗-Nash equilibrium in polynomial-time, then one
can find in polynomial-time an additive ε-Nash equilibrium with the social
welfare at least a constant factor of the optimum.
There has been also some research aiming to efficiently find an additive
ε-Nash equilibrium that approximates well the social welfare in any Nash
equilibrium. (Observe that if an additive ε-Nash equilibrium approximates
well the optimal social welfare, then it also approximates well the social wel-
fare in any Nash equilibrium.) It has been noted that the quasi-polynomial-
time algorithm for approximating Nash equilibrium by Lipton et al. [42] not
only finds an additive ε-Nash equilibrium for arbitrary ε > 0, but also the
social welfare of the equilibrium found is an ε-approximation of the social
welfare in any Nash equilibrium. In other words, in time nO(logn/ε2) we can
find an arbitrarily good additive ε-Nash equilibrium with social welfare near
to the best Nash equilibrium. (Further, we note that it is straightforward
to extend the quasi-polynomial-time algorithm from [42] to find an addi-
tive ε-Nash equilibrium whose plutocratic (or egalitarian) payoff is no more
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than ε smaller than the maximum plutocratic (or egalitarian, respectively)
payoff of a Nash equilibrium in the game.) While this result raised a hope
that it may be possible to extend it to design a polynomial-time algorithm,
recent hardness results [4, 8, 34] showed that it is unlikely. Braverman et al.
[8] showed that assuming the deterministic Exponential Time Hypothesis,
there is a constant ε > 0 such that any algorithm for finding an additive
ε-Nash equilibrium whose social welfare is at least (1− ε) times the optimal
social welfare of a Nash equilibrium of the game, requires nΩ(logn) time (see
also Hazan and Krauthgamer [34] and Austrin et al. [4] for related results
that assume hardness of finding a large planted clique). These hardness
results show that it is very unlikely to obtain a polynomial-time approxi-
mation scheme that for every positive constants ε and ε′ would construct in
polynomial-time an additive ε-Nash equilibrium whose social welfare is at
least (1 − ε′) times the optimal social welfare of a Nash equilibrium of the
game. (Austrin et al. [4] showed that also many similar variants of the bi-
criteria approximation are similarly hard.) Also, in [24] Deligkas et al. give
inapproximability results for approximate Nash equilibria that are δ close to
the best social welfare achievable by an ε-NE. On the other hand, the results
from Chapter 4 can be combined with the polynomial-time algorithm find-
ing an additive ε∗-Nash equilibrium in any bimatrix game with ε∗ ≈ 0.3393
[51], to obtain a polynomial-time algorithm that for any ε > ε∗ finds an ad-
ditive ε-Nash equilibrium whose social welfare is at least (1−
√
1−ε
1−ε∗ )
2 times
the optimal social welfare of a Nash equilibrium of the game; for ε ≥ 12 ,
the approximation bound can be made at least 2
√
ε − ε ≥ 0.914 times the
optimal social welfare.
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5.1 Preliminaries
In this chapter, our goal is to find additive ε-NE that are close to a “best”
NE. We consider two different and very natural versions of a best NE: a NE
that maximizes the maximum of the payoffs of the two players (a plutocratic
NE) and a NE that maximizes the minimum of the payoffs (an egalitarian
NE) [32].
Definition 5.1 A plutocratic NE is a NE (x∗, y∗) such that:
u∗max
def
= max{x∗TRy∗, x∗TCy∗} = max{max{xTRy, xTCy} : (x, y) is a NE}.
Definition 5.2 An egalitarian NE is a NE (x∗, y∗) such that:
u∗eg
def
= min{x∗TRy∗, x∗TCy∗} = max{min{xTRy, xTCy} : (x, y) is a NE}.
In other words, a plutocratic NE is a NE that maximizes the maximum
payoff of the two players, and an egalitarian NE is a NE that maximizes the
minimum payoff of the two players.
We extend these notions to additive ε-Nash equilibria.
Definition 5.3 An (additive) ρ-plutocratic additive ε-NE is an ad-
ditive ε-NE (x, y) such that u∗max − max{xTRy, xTCy} ≤ ρ. If a strategy
profile (x, y) is a 0-plutocratic additive ε-NE then we simply say that it is a
plutocratic additive ε-NE.
Definition 5.4 An (additive) ρ-egalitarian additive ε-NE is an addi-
tive ε-NE (x, y) such that u∗eg −min{xTRy, xTCy} ≤ ρ.
A relative ρ-egalitarian additive ε-NE is an additive ε-NE (x, y)
such that: ρ · u∗eg ≤ min{xTRy, xTCy}.
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Before we present our results, we recall a simple lemma by Austrin et
al. [4] which we use frequently in our analysis. (Since this claim was stated
without proof in [4], for the sake of completeness we include a simple proof.)
Lemma 5.5 [4] Let (R,C) be a bimatrix game and let (x∗, y∗) be a NE with
expected payoffs u∗R and u
∗
C for the row and the column player, respectively.
Then there is a strategy profile (x, j), such that xTRej ≥ u∗R and j is a
pure best-response to x (i.e., xTCej = u
∗
C).
Similarly, there is a strategy profile (i, y), such that eTi Cy ≥ u∗C and i is
a pure best-response to y (i.e., eTi Ry = u
∗
R).
Proof. We only prove the first claim; the proof of the second claim is
analogous.
Since u∗R is the expected payoff of the row player in the Nash equilibrium
(x∗, y∗), we know that u∗R = x
∗TRy∗ =
∑n
j=1(x
∗TRej)y∗(j). Therefore,
there must be at least one column j ∈ supp(y∗) such that x∗TRej ≥ u∗R.
Further, since j ∈ supp(y∗), j is a best-response strategy for the column
player, with x∗TCej = u∗C . uunionsq
5.2 Approximate Plutocratic NE
We begin our analysis with the problem of finding good additive ε-NE that
are close to plutocratic NE. We consider two cases, depending on whether
ε ≥ 12 or not. In the first case, when ε ≥ 12 , we give a polynomial-time
algorithm that finds a plutocratic additive 12 -NE, that is, an additive
1
2 -NE
whose maximum payoff is at least as large as the maximum payoff of a pluto-
cratic NE. For smaller values of ε, 3−
√
5
2 ≤ ε < 12 , we give a polynomial-time
98 CHAPTER 5. PLUTOCRATIC AND EGALITARIAN ε-NE
algorithm that finds an 1−2ε1−ε -plutocratic additive ε-NE. Note that the func-
tion 1−2ε1−ε = 1− ε1−ε decreases monotonically from 3−
√
5
2 at ε =
3−√5
2 down
to 0 at ε = 12 .
5.2.1 The First Case: ε ≥ 1
2
In this subsection, we give a construction of an additive 12 -NE (which is of
course an additive ε-NE for all ε ≥ 12) whose maximum payoff is at least as
large as the maximum payoff of a plutocratic NE. We then argue that this
construction can be turned into a polynomial-time algorithm that computes
such a plutocratic additive 12 -NE.
Let (x∗, y∗) be a plutocratic NE. We assume, without loss of generality,
that u∗max = x∗TRy∗. Then, by Lemma 5.5, there is a pure strategy j such
that: x∗TRej ≥ u∗max, and for all i, we have x∗TCej ≥ x∗TCei.
Let r be a pure best-response strategy of the row player to the pure
strategy j of the column player. We claim that the strategy profile (12x
∗ +
1
2r, j) is an additive
1
2 -NE, and the maximum payoff is at least as large as
the maximum payoff of a plutocratic NE.
This construction is very similar to the construction of Daskalakis et
al. [23] and the proof that it gives an additive 12 -NE (that we present for
completeness below) is analogous to theirs.
Lemma 5.6 The strategy profile (12x
∗ + 12r, j) is an additive
1
2 -NE.
Proof. Let c be the best-response strategy of the column player to the
strategy (12x
∗ + 12r) of the row player. The maximum incentive for the row
player to deviate is equal to her payoff in her best-response (which is r)
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minus her current payoff, that is,
eTr Rej −
1
2
x∗TRej − 1
2
eTr Rej ≤
1
2
eTr Rej ≤
1
2
.
The first inequality holds since x∗TRej ≥ 0 and the second inequality holds
since eTr Rej ≤ 1.
Similarly, the maximum incentive for the column player to deviate is
1
2
x∗TCec +
1
2
eTr Cec −
1
2
x∗TCej − 1
2
eTr Cej
≤ 1
2
eTr Cec −
1
2
eTr Cej ≤
1
2
.
The first inequality holds since j is the best-response of the column player
to the strategy x∗ of the row player, so 12x
∗TCec− 12x∗TCej ≤ 0. The second
inequality follows from eTr Cec ≤ 1 and eTr Cej ≥ 0. These two bounds above
show that the strategy profile (12x
∗+ 12r, j) is an additive
1
2 -Nash equilibrium.
uunionsq
Lemma 5.7 The maximum payoff of the strategy profile (12x
∗ + 12r, j) is at
least as large as the maximum payoff of a plutocratic NE.
Proof. First observe that since eTr Rej ≥ x∗TRej ≥ u∗max, we also have
(12x
∗+ 12er)
TRej =
1
2x
∗TRej + 12e
T
r Rej ≥ 12u∗max + 12u∗max = u∗max. Therefore,
u∗max −max{(
1
2
x∗ +
1
2
er)
TRej , (
1
2
x∗ +
1
2
er)
TCej}
≤ u∗max −max{u∗max, (
1
2
x∗ +
1
2
er)
TCej} ≤ 0.
uunionsq
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Algorithm 1
1. For every j, solve the following two LPs:
LP1 : maximize uR
xTRej ≥ uR
∀i, xTCej ≥ xTCei
LP2 : maximize uC
eTj Cy ≥ uC
∀i, eTj Ry ≥ eTi Ry
2. Among all feasible choices of j in LP1, find a solution (x, j) that
maximizes uR.
Then, find the best-response strategy r of the row player to the
strategy j of the column player.
3. Among all feasible choices of j in LP2, find a solution (j, y) that
maximizes uC .
Then, find the best-response strategy c of the column player to the
strategy j of the row player.
4. Let uR and uC be the maximum values in Steps 2 and 3, respectively.
If uR ≥ uC then return strategy profile (12x+ 12r, j); otherwise return
strategy profile (j, 12y +
1
2c).
Now we argue that the strategy profile (12x
∗+ 12r, j) described above can be
computed in polynomial-time, which is the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 5.8 There is a polynomial-time algorithm that — given a bima-
trix game (R,C) with values in [0, 1] as input — computes a plutocratic
additive 12 -NE.
Proof. We will show that Algorithm 1 presented above returns a plutocratic
additive 12 -NE. Let (x
∗, y∗) be a NE with the expected payoffs u∗R and u
∗
C for
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the row player and for the column player, respectively. By Lemma 5.5, there
is a pure strategy j, such that the strategy profile (x∗, j) is a feasible solution
in the LP1, because x∗TRej ≥ u∗R, and for all i, we have x∗TCej ≥ x∗TCei.
Therefore, the value uR found in Step 2 satisfies uR ≥ u∗R.
Similarly, there is a pure strategy j such that the strategy profile (j, y∗)
is a feasible solution in the LP2 since, by Lemma 5.5, eTj Cy
∗ ≥ u∗C , and
for all i, we have eTj Ry
∗ ≥ eTi Ry∗. Therefore, the value uC found in Step 3
satisfies uC ≥ u∗C . The claims above mean that the values uR and uC found
in Steps 2 and 3 satisfy max{uR, uC} ≥ u∗max = max{u∗R, u∗C}.
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that uR ≥ uC and therefore
the algorithm returns the strategy profile (12x +
1
2r, j). Using analogous
arguments as those used in the proof of Lemma 5.6, one can see that the
strategy profile (12x +
1
2r, j) is an additive
1
2 -Nash equilibrium. Next, the
payoff of the row player is equal to:
1
2
xTRej +
1
2
eTr Rej ≥
1
2
uR +
1
2
uR ≥ 1
2
u∗max +
1
2
u∗max = u
∗
max.
The first inequality holds since eTr Rej ≥ xTRej ≥ uR and the second one
follows from uR ≥ u∗max.
This immediately implies that the maximum payoff of the strategy profile
(12x+
1
2r, j) is at least as large as the maximum payoff of a plutocratic NE,
because:
u∗max −max{(12x+ 12er)TRej , (12x+ 12er)TCej}
≤ u∗max −max{u∗max, (12x+ 12er)TCej} ≤ 0.
Finally, we observe that Algorithm 1 performs 2n calls to a linear program-
ming solver in addition to some basic polynomial-time computations, and
since linear programming can be solved in polynomial-time, we conclude
that Algorithm 1 runs in polynomial-time. uunionsq
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5.2.2 The Second Case: 3−
√
5
2
≤ ε < 1
2
Now we consider the case when ε < 12 and show that if ε ≥ 3−
√
5
2 ≈ 0.382, a
similar approach as the one presented in Section 5.2.1 can be applied, though
this time the result is weaker: the obtained additive ε-Nash equilibrium is an
additive 1−2ε1−ε -plutocratic additive ε-NE, rather than a plutocratic additive
ε-NE, as in Section 5.2.1.
We begin by describing a construction of an appropriate strategy profile,
and then we present a polynomial-time algorithm implementing it.
Let (x∗, y∗) be a plutocratic NE. We assume, without loss of generality,
that u∗max = x∗TRy∗. We split the analysis into two cases, depending on
whether u∗max ≥ 1−2ε1−ε or not.
Case 1: u∗max ≥ 1−2ε1−ε .
Let j be a pure best-response strategy of the column player to the
strategy x∗ of the row player such that x∗TRej ≥ u∗max, whose existence
is given by Lemma 5.5. Let r be the best-response strategy of the row
player to the pure strategy j of the column player. We claim that the
strategy profile ( 12−u∗maxx
∗ + (1− 12−u∗max )r, j) is a plutocratic additive
ε-NE.
Lemma 5.9 The strategy profile
(
1
2−u∗maxx
∗ + (1 − 12−u∗max )r, j
)
is an
additive ε-NE.
Proof. The maximum incentive for the row player to deviate is upper
bounded as follows:
eTr Rej − (
1
2− u∗max
)x∗TRej − (1− 1
2− u∗max
)eTr Rej ≤
≤ 1
2− u∗max
eTr Rej −
u∗max
2− u∗max
≤ 1− u
∗
max
2− u∗max
≤ ε.
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The first inequality follows from x∗TRej ≥ u∗max and the second one
follows from eTr Rej ≤ 1. To see the third inequality, note that 1−u
∗
max
2−u∗max
is a decreasing function of u∗max and thus, it takes the maximum when
u∗max =
1−2ε
1−ε , in which case it is equal to ε.
The maximum incentive for the column player to deviate can be bounded
as follows:
1
2− u∗max
x∗TCec + (1− 1
2− u∗max
)eTr Cec −
1
2− u∗max
x∗TCej
− (1− 1
2− u∗max
)eTr Cej ≤ (1−
1
2− u∗max
)eTr Cec ≤
1− u∗max
2− u∗max
≤ ε.
The first inequality follows from the fact that since j is the best-
response strategy of the column player to the strategy x∗ of the row
player, we have 12−u∗maxx
∗TCec ≤ 12−u∗maxx
∗TCej , and eTr Cej ≥ 0. The
second inequality holds since eTr Cec ≤ 1. These two bounds imply
that the strategy profile ( 12−u∗maxx
∗ + (1 − 12−u∗max )r, j) is an additive
ε-Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
Lemma 5.10 The maximum payoff of the strategy profile
(
1
2−u∗maxx
∗+
(1 − 12−u∗max )r, j
)
is at least as large as the maximum payoff of a plu-
tocratic NE.
Proof. First observe that the payoff of the row player is bounded by
the following:
1
2− u∗max
x∗TRej + (1− 1
2− u∗max
)eTr Rej
≥ 1
2− u∗max
u∗max + (1−
1
2− u∗max
)u∗max = u
∗
max,
where we used the fact that eTr Rej ≥ x∗TRej ≥ u∗max.
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If we plug in this inequality, then we conclude that the maximum
payoff of the strategy profile ( 12−u∗maxx
∗ + (1 − 12−u∗max )r, j) is at least
as large as the maximum payoff of a plutocratic NE, because:
u∗max −max{(
1
2− u∗max
x∗ + (1− 1
2− u∗max
)er)
TRej ,
(
1
2− u∗max
x∗ + (1− 1
2− u∗max
)er)
TCej}
≤ u∗max −max{u∗max, (
1
2− u∗max
x∗ + (1− 1
2− u∗max
)er)
TCej} ≤ 0.
uunionsq
Case 2: u∗max <
1−2ε
1−ε .
By the definition of NE and by u∗max = max{x∗TRy∗, x∗TCy∗}, there
exists a strategy profile (x, y) such that: for all i, we have ei
TRy ≤
u∗max and xTCei ≤ u∗max.
We claim that if 3−
√
5
2 ≤ ε < 12 , then the strategy profile (x, y) is an
additive ε-Nash equilibrium. Indeed, we have,
∀i, eiTRy ≤ u∗max <
1− 2ε
1− ε ≤ ε,
∀i, xTCei ≤ u∗max <
1− 2ε
1− ε ≤ ε,
where we use the fact that if 3−
√
5
2 ≤ ε < 12 , then 1−2ε1−ε ≤ ε.
Next we note that the strategy profile (x, y) is an additive 1−2ε1−ε -
plutocratic additive ε-NE because: u∗max−max{xTRy, xTCy} < 1−2ε1−ε .
Now we proceed to describe a polynomial-time algorithm that imple-
ments the constructions described above.
Theorem 5.11 There is a polynomial-time algorithm that — given an ε,
3−√5
2 ≤ ε < 12 and a bimatrix game (R,C) with value in [0, 1] — computes
an additive 1−2ε1−ε -plutocratic additive ε-NE.
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Algorithm 2
1. For every j, solve the following two LPs:
LP1 : maximize uR
xTRej ≥ uR
∀i, xTCej ≥ xTCei
LP2 : maximize uC
eTj Cy ≥ uC
∀i, eTj Ry ≥ eTi Ry
2. For the LP1, among all feasible choices of j find a solution (x, j)
that maximizes uR.
Then, find the best-response strategy r of the row player to the
strategy j of the column player.
3. For the LP2, among all feasible choices of j find a solution (j, y)
that maximizes uC .
Then, find the best-response strategy c of the column player to the
strategy j of the row player.
4. Find umax = max{uR, uC}, where uR and uC are the maximum
values in Steps 2 and 3.
(a) If umax = uR ≥ 1−2ε1−ε , then return strategy profile ( 12−umaxx +
(1− 12−umax )r, j).
(b) Else, if umax = uC ≥ 1−2ε1−ε , then return strategy profile
(j, 12−umax y + (1− 12−umax )c).
(c) Otherwise, find and return an arbitrary strategy profile (x, y)
such that
∀i, eiTRy ≤ umax,
∀i, xTCei ≤ umax.
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Proof. We prove that if 3−
√
5
2 ≤ ε < 12 , then Algorithm 2 returns an
additive 1−2ε1−ε -plutocratic additive ε-NE. Our proof uses the analysis from
Cases 1 and 2 above, and it follows a similar framework as Algorithm 1 (cf.
Theorem 5.8).
Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 5.8, we observe that umax ≥ u∗max.
Next, we assume, without loss of generality, that umax = uR. Then, we
note that identical arguments as those used in the analysis above imply that
the solution returned by the algorithm will be an additive ε-Nash equilib-
rium. Therefore we only have to show that it is an additive 1−2ε1−ε -plutocratic
additive ε-NE.
We first consider the case when umax ≥ 1−2ε1−ε , in which case Algorithm 2
returns strategy profile ( 12−umaxx+(1− 12−umax )r, j). Since eTr Rej ≥ xTRej ≥
umax, we can bound the payoff of the the row player as follows:
1
2− umaxx
TRej + (1− 1
2− umax )e
T
r Rej ≥
1
2− umaxumax
+ (1− 1
2− umax )umax = umax ≥ u
∗
max.
This bound implies that in this case Algorithm 2 returns a strategy
profile whose maximum payoff is at least as large as that of a plutocratic
NE, because:
u∗max −max{(
x
2− umax + (1−
1
2− umax )er)
TRej ,
(
x
2− umax + (1−
1
2− umax )er)
TCej} ≤ u∗max −max{umax,
(
1
2− umaxx+ (1−
1
2− umax )er)
TCej} ≤ u∗max
−max{u∗max, (
1
2− umaxx+ (1−
1
2− umax )er)
TCej} ≤ 0.
Next, we have to consider the case when umax <
1−2ε
1−ε . In this case, by
the definition of NE and the fact that since umax ≥ u∗max, we know that
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there is a strategy profile (x, y) such that for all i, we have ei
TRy ≤ umax
and xTCei ≤ umax. As we have shown in the above analysis, this strategy
profile is an additive 1−2ε1−ε -plutocratic additive ε-NE.
Finally, we observe that Algorithm 2 performs 2n+ 1 calls to linear pro-
gramming solver, but since linear programming can be solved in polynomial-
time, we conclude that Algorithm 2 runs in polynomial-time. uunionsq
5.3 Approximate Egalitarian NE
Next, we analyze the problem of finding good additive ε-Nash equilibria
that are close to egalitarian equilibria. As in Section 5.2, we consider two
cases, depending on whether ε ≥ 12 , or 3−
√
5
2 ≤ ε < 12 . In the first case, we
show that it is possible to compute relative 12 -egalitarian additive ε-NE in
polynomial-time. In the second case, we show that it is possible to compute
additive 12 -egalitarian additive ε-NE in polynomial-time.
5.3.1 The First Case: ε ≥ 1/2
We first describe a construction that yields relative 12 -egalitarian additive
1
2 -NE, and then we explain how this construction can be implemented in
polynomial-time.
Let (x∗, y∗) be an egalitarian NE. Let u∗R and u
∗
C be the expected payoffs
for the row player and for the column player, respectively. We assume,
without loss of generality, that u∗eg = u∗C = x
∗TCy∗; in other words u∗R ≥ u∗C .
Then, by Lemma 5.5, there is a pure strategy j ∈ supp(y∗) such that:
x∗TRej ≥ u∗R and for all i, we have u∗C = x∗TCej ≥ x∗TCei.
Let r be the best-response strategy of the row player to the strategy j
of the column player. We claim that the strategy profile (12x
∗ + 12r, j) is a
relative 12 -egalitarian additive
1
2 -Nash equilibrium. We first note that the
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proof of Lemma 5.6 showing that this strategy profile is an additive 12 -Nash
equilibrium can be directly applied here. Therefore, we will focus here on
relative egalitarian approximation.
The payoff of the row player is equal to:
1
2
x∗TRej +
1
2
eTr Rej ≥
1
2
u∗R +
1
2
u∗R ≥ u∗R,
where the first inequality holds since eTr Rej ≥ x∗TRej ≥ u∗R. Therefore,
the strategy profile (12x
∗ + 12r, j) is a relative
1
2 -egalitarian additive
1
2 -NE
because:
min{(1
2
x∗ +
1
2
er)
TRej , (
1
2
x∗ +
1
2
er)
TCej}
≥ min{u∗R,
1
2
x∗TCej} = min{u∗R,
1
2
u∗eg} =
1
2
u∗eg.
We argue that the above construction can be implemented in polynomial-
time.
Theorem 5.12 There is a polynomial-time algorithm that — given a bi-
matrix game (R,C) with values in [0, 1] — computes a relative 12 -egalitarian
additive 12 -NE.
Proof. We will demonstrate that Algorithm 3 satisfies the promised prop-
erties of the theorem.
Let (x∗, y∗) be an egalitarian NE. Let u∗R and u
∗
C be the expected payoffs
for the row player and for the column player, respectively. If u∗R ≥ u∗C = u∗eg,
then by Lemma 5.5, there is a strategy profile (x∗, j) which is a feasible
solution of the LP1 since: x∗TRej ≥ u∗R ≥ u∗C = x∗TCej , and for all i, we
have x∗TCej ≥ x∗TCei.
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Algorithm 3
1. For every j, solve the following two LPs:
LP1 : maximize xTCej
xTRej ≥ xTCej
∀i, xTCej ≥ xTCei
LP2 : maximize eTj Ry
eTj Cy ≥ eTj Ry
∀i, eTj Ry ≥ eTi Ry
2. For the LP1, among all feasible choices of j find a solution (x, j)
that maximizes xTCej .
Then, find the best-response strategy r of the row player to strategy
j of the column player.
3. For the LP2, among all feasible choices of j find a solution (j, y)
that maximizes eTj Ry.
Then, find the best-response strategy c of the column player to the
strategy j of the row player.
4. If the maximum xTCej in Step 2 is greater or equal than the max-
imum eTj Ry in Step 3 then return strategy profile (
1
2x+
1
2r, j); oth-
erwise return strategy profile (j, 12y +
1
2c).
This means that the maximum xTCej in Step 2 is greater or equal than
u∗eg. Furthermore, if u∗C ≥ u∗R = u∗eg, then by Lemma 5.5, there is a strategy
profile (j, y∗) which is a feasible solution of the LP2, since eTj Cy
∗ ≥ u∗C ≥
u∗R = e
T
j Ry
∗, and for all i, we have eTj Ry
∗ ≥ eTi Ry∗.
This means that the maximum eTj Ry in Step 3 is greater or equal than
u∗eg. Therefore, the maximum of the maximum xTCej in Step 2 and the
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maximum eTj Ry in Step 3 is greater or equal than u
∗
eg.
Therefore, the strategy profile (12x +
1
2r, j) is a relative
1
2 -egalitarian
additive 12 -NE, because:
min{(1
2
x+
1
2
er)
TRej , (
1
2
x+
1
2
er)
TCej}
≥ min{xTCej , 1
2
xTCej} = 1
2
xTCej ≥ 1
2
u∗eg.
The first inequality follows from eTr Rej ≥ xTRej ≥ xTCej and the second
one holds since xTCej ≥ u∗eg.
Finally, we observe that Algorithm 3 performs some basic polynomial-
time computations and 2n calls to linear programming solver, and hence it
runs in polynomial-time. uunionsq
5.3.2 The Second Case: 3−
√
5
2
≤ ε < 1
2
We first describe a construction that yields an additive 12 -egalitarian additive
ε-NE, and then we explain how this construction can be implemented in
polynomial-time.
Let (x∗, y∗) be an egalitarian NE. Let u∗R be the expected payoff for the
row player and u∗C be the expected payoff for the column player. We assume,
without loss of generality, that u∗R ≥ u∗C . We consider two cases, depending
on whether u∗R ≥ 1−2ε1−ε or not.
Case 1: u∗R ≥ 1−2ε1−ε . Let j be a pure best-response strategy of the column
player to the strategy x∗ of the row player such that x∗TRej ≥ u∗R
and x∗TCej = u∗C , whose existence follows by Lemma 5.5. Let r be a
pure best-response strategy of the row player to the strategy j of the
column player. Then, we claim that the strategy profile ( 12−u∗Rx
∗+(1−
1
2−u∗R )r, j) is an additive
1
2 -egalitarian additive ε-Nash equilibrium.
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We first note that the fact that this strategy profile is an additive
ε-Nash equilibrium can be shown in the same way as before.
Hence we focus on establishing the additive egalitarian approximation.
Note that the payoff of the row player is bounded as follows:
1
2− u∗R
x∗TRej+(1− 1
2− u∗R
)eTr Rej ≥
1
2− u∗R
u∗R+(1−
1
2− u∗R
)u∗R ≥ u∗R.
This allows us to conclude the analysis because:
u∗eg −min{(
1
2− u∗R
x∗ + (1− 1
2− u∗R
)er)
TRej ,
(
1
2− u∗R
x∗ + (1− 1
2− u∗R
)er)
TCej}
≤ u∗eg −min{u∗R, (
1
2− u∗R
x∗ + (1− 1
2− u∗R
)er)
TCej}
≤ u∗eg −min{u∗R,
1
2− u∗R
x∗TCej} = u∗eg
− 1
2− u∗R
x∗TCej = u∗eg −
1
2− u∗R
u∗eg
≤ u∗eg −
1
2
u∗eg =
1
2
u∗eg ≤
1
2
.
Case 2: u∗R <
1−2ε
1−ε . Find a strategy profile (x, y) such that for all i, we
have ei
TRy ≤ u∗R and xTCei ≤ u∗R. Existence of such a strategy
profile follows from the definition of NE and from the fact that u∗R =
max{x∗TRy∗, x∗TCy∗}. Next, we note that such a strategy profile
is an additive 1−2ε1−ε -NE since u
∗
R <
1−2ε
1−ε . Therefore, since
1−2ε
1−ε ≤ ε
for 3−
√
5
2 ≤ ε < 12 , such a strategy profile is an additive ε-NE. We
conclude that it is an additive 12 -egalitarian additive ε-NE because for
every ε > 13 , we have:
u∗eg −min{xTRy, xTCy} <
1− 2ε
1− ε <
1
2
.
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Algorithm 4
1. For every j, solve the following two LPs:
LP1 : maximize xTCej
xTRej ≥ xTCej
∀i, xTCej ≥ xTCei
∀i, xTRej ≥ eTi Rβ
LP2 : maximize eTj Ry
eTj Cy ≥ eTj Ry
∀i, eTj Ry ≥ eTi Ry
∀i, eTj Cy ≥ αTCei
2. For the LP1, among all feasible choices of j find a solution (x, j)
that maximizes xTCej . For the strategy profile (x, j) assign uR =
xTRej . Then, find the best-response strategy r of the row player to
the strategy j of the column player.
3. For the LP2, among all feasible choices of j find a solution (j, y) that
maximizes eTj Ry. For the strategy profile (j, y) assign uC = e
T
j Cy.
Then, find the best-response strategy c of the column player to
strategy j of the row player.
4. If the maximum xTCej in Step 2 is greater than the maximum e
T
j Ry
in Step 3, then if uR ≥ 1−2ε1−ε return strategy profile ( 12−uRx + (1 −
1
2−uR )r, j); else return strategy profile (x, β).
Otherwise, if uC ≥ 1−2ε1−ε then return strategy profile (j, 12−uC y +
(1− 12−uC )c); else return profile (α, y).
Theorem 5.13 There is a polynomial-time algorithm that — given an ε,
3−√5
2 ≤ ε < 12 , and a bimatrix game (R,C) with values in [0, 1] — computes
an additive 12 -egalitarian additive ε-NE.
Proof. We will show that if 3−
√
5
2 ≤ ε < 12 , then Algorithm 4 returns an
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additive 12 -egalitarian additive ε-Nash equilibrium.
Let (x∗, y∗) be an egalitarian NE, and let u∗R and u
∗
C be the expected
payoffs for the row player and the column player, respectively. If u∗R ≥ u∗C =
u∗eg, then the definition of NE and Lemma 5.5 imply that there is a strategy
profile (x∗, j) and a strategy β which are a feasible solution of LP1 since:
x∗TRej ≥ u∗R ≥ u∗C = x∗TCej , and for all i, we have x∗TCej ≥ x∗TCei and
x∗TRej ≥ u∗R ≥ eTi Rβ. This means that the maximum xTCej in Step 2 is
greater than or equal to u∗eg.
Similarly, if u∗C ≥ u∗R = u∗eg, then the definition of NE together with
Lemma 5.5 imply that there is a strategy profile (j, y∗) and a strategy α
that are feasible solution of LP2, since: eTj Cy
∗ ≥ u∗C ≥ u∗R = eTj Ry∗, and
for all i, we have eTj Ry
∗ ≥ eTi Ry∗ and eTj Cy∗ ≥ u∗C ≥ αTCei. This means
that the maximum eTj Ry in Step 3 is greater than or equal to u
∗
eg. As a
result, the maximum of the maximum xTCej in Step 2 and the maximum
eTj Ry in Step 3 is greater than or equal to u
∗
eg.
Let us assume that the maximum xTCej in Step 2 is greater than the
maximum eTj Ry in Step 3; the other symmetric case can be dealt with
analogously. Therefore, if uR ≥ 1−2ε1−ε , then Algorithm 4 returns the strategy
profile ( 12−uRx + (1 − 12−uR )r, j). Using the arguments analogous to those
used earlier, we note that the strategy profile ( 12−uRx + (1 − 12−uR )r, j) is
an additive ε-NE. Next, we argue that the strategy profile profile ( 12−uRx+
(1− 12−uR )r, j) is an additive 12 -egalitarian additive ε-NE, because:
u∗eg−min{(
1
2− uRx+(1−
1
2− uR )er)
TRej , (
1
2− uRx+(1−
1
2− uR )er)
TCej}
≤ u∗eg −min{u∗eg, (
1
2− uRx+ (1−
1
2− uR )er)
TCej} ≤ u∗eg
−min{u∗eg,
1
2− uRx
TCej} ≤ u∗eg −min{u∗eg,
1
2− uRu
∗
eg}
= u∗eg −
1
2− uRu
∗
eg ≤ u∗eg −
1
2
u∗eg =
1
2
u∗eg ≤
1
2
.
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The first inequality holds since ( 12−uRx+(1− 12−uR )er)TRej ≥ 12−uRxTCej
+ (1 − 12−uR )eTr Cej = xTCej ≥ u∗eg, and the third inequality holds since
xTCej ≥ u∗eg.
Next, we consider the remaining case, when uR <
1−2ε
1−ε , in which case
Algorithm 4 returns the strategy profile (x, β). We first note that this strat-
egy profile is an additive ε-NE since for every ε ≥ 3−
√
5
2 and for every i, we
have: eTi Rβ ≤ uR < 1−2ε1−ε ≤ ε and xTCei ≤ xTCej ≤ uR < 1−2ε1−ε ≤ ε.
Furthermore, the strategy profile (x, β) is an additive 12 -egalitarian ad-
ditive ε-NE because for every ε > 13 , we have:
u∗eg −min{xTRβ, xTCβ} <
1− 2ε
1− ε <
1
2
.
In summary, we have shown that the strategy returned by Algorithm 4
is always an additive 12 -egalitarian additive ε-NE.
Finally, we observe that Algorithm 4 performs some basic polynomial-
time computations and 2n calls to linear programming solver, and hence it
runs in polynomial-time. uunionsq
Part III
Communication complexity
of approximate Nash
equilibria
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Chapter 6
Communication complexity
In this chapter, we study the approximation of Nash equilibria in bimatrix
games in the context of communication complexity—amount of communi-
cation between the players needed to find an additive approximate Nash
equilibrium. Ideas that are discussed in this chapter help to improve the ap-
proximation of Nash equilibria in the context of communication complexity
(see [13]). We consider a natural scenario where there are two players who
want to agree on a strategy profile that would be an additive approximate
Nash equilibrium. The players are independent and each of them knows
only her payoffs (as defined by the payoff matrices); but they can commu-
nicate to learn about the intentions and the entries of the payoff matrix of
the other player. The objective of the players is to select mixed strategies,
such that each player will have only limited incentives to deviate from their
strategies (for example, that the strategy profile will form an additive ε-Nash
equilibrium or an additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium).
The study of communication in the computation of equilibria in games
has been frequently appearing in the game theory in the past, see, e.g.,
Conitzer and Sandholm [11], Hart and Mansour [33], and Goldberg and
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Pastink [31] and the references therein. Very recently, Goldberg and Pastink
[31] initiated the study of finding additive ε-Nash equilibria and additive ε-
well-supported Nash equilibria with the goal of minimizing the parameter ε,
while performing a small amount of communication between the players. It
is easy to see that the task is trivial if communication of O(n2) in the number
n of strategies bits is allowed (assuming, for simplicity, that the precision of
each entry is of constant length), each player can transmit its entire payoff
matrix to the other player, and with this the players can compute an exact
Nash equilibrium. Goldberg and Pastink have shown that even with no
communication one can find an additive 34 -Nash equilibrium, but finding an
additive 12 -Nash equilibrium is impossible without any communication [31].
Motivated by these positive and negative results, Goldberg and Pastink
[31] focused on the most interesting setting, when one allows only a poly-
logarithmic (in n) amount of communication between the players. They
demonstrated that with so limited communication, one can compute additive
0.438-Nash equilibria and additive 0.732-well-supported Nash equilibria.
In this chapter, we show that with O(log2 n) bits of communication,
one can find an additive (3−
√
5
2 + δ)-Nash equilibrium (note that
3−√5
2 ≈
0.382) and an additive (23 + δ)-well-supported Nash equilibrium, for any
δ > 0. This improves upon earlier bounds due to Goldberg and Pastink
[31]. Furthermore, we note that the bounds we obtain are very close to
the best known polynomial-time bounds with unlimited communication for
these problems: our bound of additive 0.382-Nash equilibrium comes close
to the bound of 0.3393 of Tsaknakis and Spirakis [51], and our bound of
additive 0.667-well-supported Nash equilibrium comes close to the bound of
0.6528 [13].
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Model of communication. We will consider the standard communica-
tion model, see, e.g., Kushilevitz and Nisan [40]. Each player has access to
its payoff matrix, the row player can see the entire matrix R and the col-
umn player can see matrix C. The players can communicate between each
other and they can perform local computations. The communication will
be performed in rounds, and in each round each player may send a single
bit of information to the other player. Between each round, each player can
perform arbitrary local computations (though it should be noted that in our
protocol, each player will perform only polynomial-time computations). At
the end of the algorithm, each player computes her own mixed strategy.
We want to design a protocol that the players will use to collectively
compute a strategy profile (x, y), which is an additive ε-Nash equilibrium or
an additive ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium. The goal is to ensure that ε is
as small as possible, and that the protocol performs only a poly-logarithmic
number of communication rounds, that is, the players communicate only
polylog(n) bits.
6.1 How to communicate mixed strategies
In this section, we will show how the players can communicate “approxi-
mations” of their mixed strategies with O(log2 n) bits of communication.
Without loss of generality, we perform the analysis from the point of view
of the row player.
Let y be a mixed strategy that the row player wants to communicate to
the column player. Then, the row player can create an empirical distribu-
tion ye from y by first taking K = dlnn/δ2e random samples according to
the distribution y and accordingly creating a multiset A of pure strategies
in {1, . . . , n}, for any δ > 0. The probability of a pure strategy in the dis-
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tribution ye is its frequency in the multiset divided by the total number of
samples K. Observe that by applying Hoeffding inequality, for any strategy
k, it holds that:
Pr
[∣∣eTkRye −E[eTkRye]∣∣ ≥ δ] = Pr[∣∣eTkRye − eTkRy∣∣ ≥ δ] ≤ 2e−2Kδ2 ≤ 2n2 .
It follows that,
n∑
k=1
Pr
[∣∣eTkRye −E[eTkRye]∣∣ ≥ δ] = n∑
k=1
Pr
[∣∣eTkRye − eTkRy∣∣ ≥ δ] ≤ 2n.
and hence,
Pr
[∣∣eTkRye − eTkRy∣∣ ≤ δ] ≥ 1− 2n.
This means that with high probability the expected payoff of any strategy
k when the row player picks strategy ye differs from the expected payoff of
strategy k when the row player picks strategy y by at most δ.
Note that there are K = O(log n) strategies relevant to any ye, and each
such strategy can be described usingO(log n) bits. Therefore, any player can
communicate to the other player an approximation ye of its mixed strategy
y using O(log2 n) bits so that, with high probability, the difference between
the expected payoffs of these two strategies is upper bounded by δ. We
conclude to the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1 Let y be a mixed strategy, then a player can create an empirical
mixed strategy ye from y such that for any pure strategy k
∣∣eTkRye−eTkRy∣∣ ≤
δ, with high probability, for any δ > 0.
6.2 Communication-efficient additive 0.382-Nash
equilibria
In this section we will describe how to achieve an additive (3−
√
5
2 + δ)-Nash
equilibrium with poly-logarithmic communication between the players, for
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an arbitrary positive δ. (Since 3−
√
5
2 ≈ 0.38197, this gives an additive 0.382-
Nash equilibrium.) To do this, we will use the polynomial-time centralized
algorithm—as it was described in Chapter 2 which gives an additive 3−
√
5
2 -
Nash equilibrium, and we will show how to turn it into a protocol that uses
only O(log2 n) bits of communication.
We will assume that the players only know their own payoff matrix.
Therefore, the row player is able to solve on her own (without any commu-
nication with the column player) the zero-sum game (R,−R), obtaining for
it a Nash equilibrium (x∗, y∗) with value vR = (x∗)TRy∗, and the column
player is able to solve on her own the zero-sum game (−C,C), obtaining
for it a Nash equilibrium (xˆ, yˆ) with value vC = (xˆ)
TCyˆ. We separate our
analysis into two cases, one in which both values vR, vC are less than
3−√5
2
and one in which at least one of the values is greater or equal to 3−
√
5
2 .
In the first case, when max{vR, vC} < 3−
√
5
2 , the row player draws an
empirical distribution y∗e from y∗ and the column player draws an empiri-
cal distribution xˆe from xˆ. Then, they communicate the strategies y
∗
e , xˆe,
and play the strategy profile (xˆe, y
∗
e). This is an additive (
3−√5
2 + δ)-Nash
equilibrium, since for every pure strategy k, we have:
eTkRy
∗
e ≤ eTkRy∗ + δ ≤ vR + δ ≤ 3−
√
5
2 + δ,
and
(xˆe)
TCek ≤ (xˆ)TCek + δ ≤ vC + δ ≤ vR + δ ≤ 3−
√
5
2 + δ.
In both cases, the first inequality holds because of Lemma 6.1. So, if r is
a best-response strategy of the row player to the strategy y∗e of the column
player, we have:
eTr Ry
∗
e − (xˆe)TRy∗e ≤
3−√5
2
+ δ,
since (xˆe)
TRy∗e ≥ 0. Also, if c is a best-response strategy of the column
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player to the strategy xˆe of the row player, we have:
(xˆe)
TCec − (xˆe)TCy∗e ≤
3−√5
2
+ δ,
since (xˆe)
TCy∗e ≥ 0.
In the second case, we assume without loss of generality that vR ≥ vC .
Then, the row player finds the empirical distribution x∗e from x∗. We know
that for every pure strategy k, we have:
(x∗e)
TRek ≥ (x)TRek − δ ≥ vR − δ.
The first inequality holds because of Lemma 6.1 and the second one holds fol-
lows from the definition of the Nash equilibrium in zero-sum games. Then,
the row player communicates the strategy x∗e to the column player. The
column player finds the best-response strategy j to this strategy and com-
municates it to the row player. Then, the row player finds the best-response
strategy r to the strategy j of the column player. At the end, they play the
strategy profile ( 12−vRx
∗
e +
1−vR
2−vR r, j). Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.10,
this is an additive (3−
√
5
2 + δ)-Nash equilibrium, since the regret of the row
player is
1− vR + δ
2− vR ≤
1− vR
2− vR + δ ≤
3−√5
2
+ δ.
On the other hand, the regret of the column player is 1−vR2−vR ≤
3−√5
2 . Notice
that since 3−
√
5
2 < 0.382, we can conclude that one can find an additive
(0.382+δ)-Nash equilibrium with communication complexity O(log2 n) bits,
for any δ > 0.
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6.3 Communication-efficient additive 23-well-
supported Nash equilibria
Similarly as in the case of additive ε-Nash equilibria, in the case of additive
ε-well-supported Nash equilibria we will describe a centralized algorithm to
achieve an additive 23 -well-supported Nash equilibrium, and then we will
describe how we can transform it in a communication efficient decentralized
algorithm to achieve an additive (23 + δ)-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
This centralized algorithm inspired the work of the paper [13].
Theorem 6.2 For any bimatrix game with payoff matrices (R,C) ∈ [0, 1]n×n,
there is a polynomial-time algorithm that returns an additive 23 -well-supported
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let (R,−R) and (−C,C) be two zero-sum games with values
vR = (x
∗)TRy∗, vC = (xˆ)TCyˆ and with Nash equilibria (x∗, y∗) and (xˆ, yˆ),
respectively. We assume without loss of generality that vR ≥ vC . Then,
the following Algorithm 1 returns an additive 23 -well-supported Nash equi-
librium.
In Step 1, the algorithm returns the strategy profile (xˆ, y∗), this is an
additive 23 -well-supported Nash equilibrium since for every strategy k of the
row player, we have:
eTkRy
∗ ≤ vR ≤ 23 ,
and for every column player pure strategy k, we have:
(xˆ)TCek ≤ vC ≤ vR ≤ 23 .
In Step 2.(a), this is also an additive 23 -well-supported Nash equilibrium
since the row player plays the best-response strategy and for every column
player strategy k, we have (x∗)TCek ≤ 23 .
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Algorithm 1
1. If vR ≤ 23 , then return (xˆ, y∗).
2. Otherwise
(a) If for all j it holds that (x∗)TCej ≤ 23 , then return (x∗, y∗).
(b) Otherwise
i. Find a column c such that (x∗)TCec > 23 .
ii. In this column, find is a pure strategy profile (i, c) such that
Ric ≥ 13 and Cic ≥ 13 .
iii. Return pure strategy profile (i, c).
In Step 2.(b), for every column player strategy k, vR = (x
∗)TRek > 23 ,
so there is at least one column c such that (x∗)TRec > 23 and (x
∗)TCec > 23 .
In this column, there is at least one row i such that Ric ≥ 13 and Cic ≥ 13 .
This is an additive 23 -well-supported Nash equilibrium.
For the sake of contradiction, assume that there is no such pure strategy
profile. Thus, for every row player strategy i, Ric ≥ 13 implies that Cic < 13 .
Then, let p be the minimum total probability of the entries such that Ric ≥
1
3 , we can bound this probability
p+ (1− p)
(
1
3
− t
)
>
2
3
,
for any arbitrarily small t > 0 and hence we obtain
p >
1
3 + t
2
3 + t
.
But, the maximum payoff of the column player is
p
(
1
3
− t
)
+ 1− p = 1− p
(
2
3
+ t
)
≤ 2
3
− t < 2
3
,
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for any p >
1
3
+t
2
3
+t
. This is a contradiction, so there is at least one pure
strategy profile (i, c) such that Ric ≥ 13 and Cic ≥ 13 . uunionsq
We now describe how to transform the previous algorithm in the context
of communication complexity. First of all, the row player solves the zero-sum
game (R,−R) with equilibrium (x∗, y∗) and value vR = (x∗)TRy∗, and the
column player solves the zero-sum game (−C,C) with equilibrium (xˆ, yˆ) and
value vC = (xˆ)
TCyˆ. We assume, without loss of generality, that vR ≥ vC .
We separate the analysis in to two cases: vR <
2
3 and vR ≥ 23 .
If vR <
2
3 , then the row player finds an empirical distribution y
∗
e from
y∗ and the column player finds the empirical distribution xˆe from xˆ. The
players send each other their empirical distributions and then they play the
strategy profile (xˆe, y
∗
e). This is an additive (
2
3 + δ)-well-supported Nash
equilibrium since for every pure strategy k, we have:
eTkRy
∗
e ≤ eTkRy∗ + δ ≤ vR + δ < 23 + δ,
xˆTe Cek ≤ xˆTCek + δ ≤ vC + δ ≤ vR + δ < 23 + δ.
In both cases, the first inequality holds because of Lemma 6.1.
If vR ≥ 23 , and if (x∗)TCek ≤ 2/3 for all k, by Lemma 6.1 we have
that (x∗e)TCek ≤ 23 + δ for all k, then the row player sends the empirical
distribution y∗e to the column player and the players play (x∗e, y∗e). This is
an additive (23 + δ)-well-supported Nash equilibrium, since for every pure
strategy k, we have:
(x∗e)
TCek ≤ 2
3
+ δ.
Also, for every k ∈ supp(x∗e), we have
eTkRy
∗
e ≥ eTkRy∗ − δ = vR − δ ≥
2
3
− δ,
The first inequality holds by Lemma 6.1 and the equality holds by the def-
inition of Nash equilibria and the fact that in the support of (x∗e) belong
126 CHAPTER 6. COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY
strategies that they are best-response strategies with expected payoff vR.
Therefore, the incentive to deviate to the best-response strategy is at most
1− eTkRy∗e ≤
1
3
+ δ <
2
3
+ δ.
Otherwise there is a column c such that (x∗e)TCec >
2
3 + δ and (x
∗
e)
TRec ≥
vR−δ ≥ 23−δ. We claim that for some i ∈ supp(x∗e), there is a pure strategy
profile such that Ric ≥ 13 and Cic ≥ 13 .
For the sake of contradiction, let assume that there is no such a pure
strategy profile. Thus, for every pure strategy i ∈ supp(x∗e), Ric ≥ 13 implies
that Cic <
1
3 . Then, let p be the minimum total probability of the entries
such that Ric ≥ 13 , for every pure strategy i ∈ supp(x∗e), we can bound this
probability as
p+ (1− p)
(
1
3
− t
)
≥ 2
3
− δ,
for any arbitrary small t > 0 and therefore we have
p ≥
1
3 − δ + t
2
3 + t
.
The maximum payoff of the column player is
p
(
1
3
− t
)
+ 1− p = 1− p
(
2
3
+ t
)
≤ 2
3
+ δ − t < 2
3
+ δ,
for any p ≥
1
3
−δ+t
2
3
+t
. This is a contradiction, so there is at least one pure
strategy profile (i, c) such that Ric ≥ 13 and Cic ≥ 13 .
So, the row player sends the empirical distribution x∗e to the column
player, the column player finds the best-response strategy c to the strategy
x∗e. Then, the players, via communication, can find a pure strategy (i, c), for
i ∈ supp(x∗e), such that Ric ≥ 13 and Cic ≥ 13 checking at most O(log n/δ2)
pure strategies, since the size of the support of x∗e is O(log n/δ2). Then, the
players play the strategy profile (i, c), but since Ric ≥ 13 and Cic ≥ 13 , this
is an additive 23 -well-supported Nash equilibrium.
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